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1Preface
“Four years have passed since the beginning of my PhD studies in Clausthal.” This is the first line
of my PhD thesis and I can say almost the same now: another four years have passed since the
beginning of my “habilitation project”—in retrospect to the time of submission. I received my
PhD in October 2010; thereafter, I was employed as an assistant professor in the Computational
Intelligence group, led by Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Dix, at Clausthal University of Technology for another
four years. Today, however, it is safe to say that there won’t be yet “another four years” in
Clausthal: a vacancy at TU Delft in the Netherlands arose where I have started as an assistant
professor in the Interactive Intelligence group in February 2015.
Before my move abroad early this year, I took the final steps towards the completion of my
habilitation in Computer Science. On the 9th of December 2014, I gave the scientific talk1 on
Suchalgorithmen (search algorithms), followed by the Probevorlesung on Grundlagen der Com-
putersicherheit (foundations of computer security) on the 7th of January 2015. My habilitation
thesis itself is cumulative, consisting of 13 papers and the present extended summary of my
work. My thesis continues, to some extent, the line of research of my PhD, and, to a greater one,
investigates formal methods to analyze, control and coordinate the decision making of agents in
multi-agent systems. The reviewer committee consisted of: Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen Dix (TU Clausthal),
Prof. Dr. Thomas Eiter (TU Vienna), Prof. Dr. Jo¨rg Mu¨ller (TU Clausthal), Prof. Dr. Michael
Wooldridge (University of Oxford). I feel very honoured that they were part of my habilitation
process and am very grateful for their effort.
Finally, I am particularly thankful to Ju¨rgen Dix for the great time in his group and his
continuous support. I have learnt a lot from him and have always very much enjoyed working for
him and with him. I hope that we will stay in touch.
Delft, October 13, 2015
Nils Bulling
1 The habilitation process requires to give two talks: the Wissenschaftlicher Vortrag and the Probevor-
lesung.

1Introduction
We have been accustomed to computer systems that do what we tell them to do—provided that
they do not malfunction. Calculators do the arithmetic we ask them to; word processors take
keyboard inputs, process and display them; databases store the data entered by users. From
this perspective, computers are electronic slaves. Indeed, these examples are not very astound-
ing: today’s computer systems are more intelligent. If a customer buys a product at Amazon, the
customer will automatically get suggestions for future shoppings, which are often quite adequate;
as if Amazon knew ones desires. Of course, this is no magic but “just” a clever algorithm which
makes recommendations based on existing (historical) data. We have become used to such rec-
ommender systems [Resnick and Varian, 1997; Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2005], and have higher
demands on computer systems. A computer system/program should support us on a daily ba-
sis; it should behave intelligently and pro-actively (i.e. doing something without explicitly being
asked about), function in a goal-driven way, and be reliable. Since the 90s programs with such
characteristics are often referred to as (intelligent) agents [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]. It
is easy to imagine many of these agents operating in the same environment, working together
or against each other, pursuing their own tasks or a common task. A key feature of multi-agent
systems (MASs) [Wooldridge, 2013, 2009; Ferber, 1999; Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995] is au-
tonomy: agents take their decisions autonomously, possibly selfishly in order to achieve their
objectives. If objectives of agents are aligned or if help of others is required, cooperation and
interaction with other agents can be beneficial, or even necessary, to solve their complex tasks.
In order to be successful in cooperating and interacting with others, agents need to be skilled in
many disciplines, e.g. they need to be able to communicate [Chopra and Singh, 2013], cooperate,
and negotiate [Kraus, 1997], as well as to reason strategically. All that requires agents to make
good decisions.
The following example illustrates this. In a smart household it is easy to imagine a variety
of tasks to be performed by intelligent agents. An agent hovers the floor, others regulate the
temperature, or order groceries. Agents can also be used to optimize the day schedule of the home
owner, of course taking recent events like the weather forecast into account. To take the burden
from the customer, each agent should pursue its tasks in a completely autonomous manner, no
need to instruct the hover robot when it is time to start the cleaning. Although all agents pursue
their own tasks, they need to communicate and cooperate with each other. The scheduler agent,
for example, should make sure that noisy tasks are performed when the house owner is away and
assign robots to the available recharging stations. This requires robots to plan and to negotiate
with each other, possibly making compromises one way or another.
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This example illustrates that there are situations in which the behaviour of the agents needs
to be coordinated in order to achieve a satisfactory overall behaviour emerging from the agents
individual activities. Coordination can be sufficient if agents’ objectives are aligned. If this is
not the case, however, more sophisticated mechanisms are needed. Many reasons can require the
coordination of agents’ beaviour in order to avoid undesirable effects like deadlocks. The desired
system behavior of the MAS can be a combination of the agents individual tasks or any other
property specified by the system designer/ the system principal. Still, it is important to empha-
size that agents are primarily interested in satisfying their own objectives. As a consequence,
the emergent system behavior may not satisfy the system specification: control mechanisms are
needed. This is a challenging task and not as simple as it may look, due to the agents’ auton-
omy. In this context, control often means trying to convince agents to act in specific ways, e.g.
by providing incentives which give agents a reason to follow a course of action that is desir-
able for ensuring the system objective. To offer the right incentives and to design appropriate
mechanisms, this requires to understand agents’ behavior and their decision making process.
In our example of a smart home, norms can, e.g., be used to prohibit hovering at night
hours. Enforcing this norm can be achieved by the regimentation of violating behavior, thereby
intervening in the agent’s autonomy. Alternatively, sanctions can be imposed to deal with norm
violations, not directly affecting the agent’s autonomy. For example, if the hover robot performs
its task at night hours, the scheduler could sanction the robot by assigning it less time for
recharging. It is up to the hoover robot to comply with the norm or to bear the consequences.
An regimenting approach could simply ensure that the robot is switched off at night.
Smart grids provide another timely example of MASs in which decisions and behaviors need to
be coordinate and controlled. Smart grids describe future power grids; first (prototypical) small-
scale smart grids have already been developed and are being tested. A smart grid involves different
stakeholders each of which with its own interests and objectives. Power suppliers, e.g., want to
maximize profit, but also have to ensure good power quality (avoiding energy peaks, blackouts,
etc.) and have to comply with regulations. On one hand, users want to minimize costs, but also
expect constant and reliable power availability, as well as transparent and personalized tariffs;
on the other hand, they want their privacy to be ensured. Thus, optimization is possible along
different dimensions which usually required to make trade-offs. A further challenge is the use of
renewable energy which may not guarantee a flat power output. This requires a good prediction
of the behavior of users. Based on these models, methods with the aim to change the habits
of users’ can be developed. For example, users could be disincentivized to use machines with a
high electricity demand at peak hours. This illustrates the importance of a careful analysis and
prediction of user behavior in order to design customized tariffs and to have accurate estimations
of the expected power usage. Similarly, the activities of electricity producers, which can be
customers or the power providers themselves, need to be coordinated. More power needs to be
provided at peak hours, whereas it can be necessary to downscale power production at other
times. Simple coordination may be insufficient in cases of emergency situations, e.g. to prevent
acute blackouts; intelligent control mechanisms need to come into operation.
Another challenge of the settings described above is their high complexity, resulting, e.g.,
from the various interactions taking place between the different actors. To cope with this com-
plexity tools to model, analyse, verify and simulate such systems are needed. In this thesis we
investigate foundational principles of such tools for analysis, controlling and coordinating com-
plex interactions and decision making in MASs. The contributions of this thesis can be divided
into three parts which focus on:
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1. formal methods for specifying and reasoning about the decision making of agents, focussing
on strategic aspects. We consider different (strategic) logics to capture characteristics of
agents’ capabilities affecting their decision making. This is the subject of Chapter 2.
2. formal methods to coordinate and to control agents’ decisions. We investigate rules and norms
to incentivize agents to change their way of acting such that the emerging system behavior
complies with the system specification. Aspects of detecting norm violations and ascribing
responsibility to agents are discussed. This is the content of Chapter 3.
3. how game theoretical methods can be used to analyze, predict, and understand how intelligent
agents take their decisions. These methods can serve as foundation of smart applications; we
present one such approach showing how to compute stable/fair network topologies in mobile
ad-hoc networks using game theoretical methods. This is the topic of Chapter 4.

2Reasoning about Strategic Aspects in Decision Making
In the late 90s, Alur et al. [1997, 2002] proposed the alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) ATL∗
and its syntactically restricted fragment ATL. The logics merge temporal logic with basic game
theoretic concepts and allow to reason about strategic abilities of groups of agents. This can
be thought of a game between two opposed groups of players trying to bring about a property
and to prevent it, respectively. Here, bringing about means that the proponents have a winning
strategy—a strategy that is successful against all the opponents’ counter-strategies. The property
can be a temporal or strategic property; for example, it can specify that the scheduler robot and
the hover robot of our smart home example working together as a team can guarantee that the
hovering task is performed during the day, independent of the actions of all other robots. The
language of ATL∗ is given by formulae ϕ generated by the grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ with
γ ::= ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | Xγ | Gγ | γUγ
where p ∈ Π is a proposition drawn from the set of all propositions Π, and A is a set of
agents drawn from the set of all agents Agt. The logic ATL restricts1 ATL∗ by requiring that
each temporal operator, X (in the next moment), G (always from now on) and U (until), is
immediately preceded by a cooperation modality 〈〈·〉〉. For example, 〈〈A〉〉X(ϕUψ) is an ATL∗-
formula but not an ATL-formula. We usually denote agents by natural numbers 1, 2, . . . and
variables referring to them by a, b, . . . . The temporal operator Fγ ≡ >Uγ (now or sometime in
the future γ holds) is defined as macro. The formula 〈〈1〉〉X〈〈2〉〉Fwin expresses2 that agent 1 has
a strategy to ensure that in the next moment agent 2 has a strategy to achieve eventually win.
Goranko and van Drimmelen [2006] proposed a sound and complete axiomatization of ATL that
allows to reason about strategic abilities of agents.
Concurrent game structures (CGSs) serve as models3 of ATL∗. These are transition systems/
Kripke structures in which transitions are labelled by joint action profiles, consisting of one action
per agent, enabling the very transitions. An example of a CGS is shown in Figure 2.1. States are
represented by qi for i = 0, 1, 2. An action tuple has the form (push,wait) containing an action
of the first agent (push) and of the second agent (wait). As common for Kripke structures, states
are labelled with propositions representing the information available at them; in the figure,
proposition pos0 is true at state q0. A path λ in a model is an infinite sequence of states (an
1 In the case of ATL∗ the temporal operator G (now and always) can be defined as macro Gγ ≡ ¬F¬γ.
2 For “small”coalitions like {1, 2} we just write 〈〈1, 2〉〉 instead of 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉.
3 Other models have been proposed as well, e.g. alternating transitions systems and modular interpreted
systems.
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Fig. 2.1. Two robots and a carriage: concurrent game structure M0
element from Qω) interconnected by transitions, e.g. q0q1q
ω
2 is a path in the model M0. The path
models the system behavior in which the systems starts in q0, then transitions to q1 and then
changes its state to q2 in which the system remains forever. Analogously, a history is a non-empty,
finite sequence of interconnected states (an element from Q+). We use λ[i] and λ[i,∞] to refer
to the ith state on λ and to the subpath starting at position i, respectively.
Crucial is the notion of strategy. It is a conditional plan that describes (or prescribes) what
the agent is going to do. A perfect recall, perfect information strategy for an agent a (also called
IR-strategy4) is defined as a function s : Q+ → Act mapping state sequences to actions such
that, if s(q1 . . . qn) = α then action α is available to agent a at state qn. Given a model M, a state
q in the model and a collective strategy sA—i.e. a set of strategies consisting of one strategy for
each agent in A—the outcome of sA from q in M is the set of all paths that are consistent with
sA, semi-formally:
outM(q, sA) =
{λ | λ is a path starting in q resulting from agents in A following their strategy sA}
(2.1)
It is important to note that agents outside A, i.e. Agt\A, can act arbitrarily. Hence, in general
the outcome set contains more than one path. The formal semantics of formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ is defined
as follows:
M, q |=IR 〈〈A〉〉ϕ if, and only if, group A ⊆ Agt has a collective IR-strategy sA (i.e. a
collection of individual strategies, one per agent from A) such that for all paths λ ∈
outM(q, sA) we have that M, λ |=IR ϕ.
As already mentioned above, the subscript IR indicates that agents are assumed to have
perfect information about the world (I) and perfect recall (R). For illustration we consider
Figure 2.1. We have that M0, q0 |=IR ¬〈〈1〉〉Fpos1 expressing that it is not the case that agent
1 can ensure to eventually make pos1 true. Formally, this means that for all IR-strategies s1 of
player 1 there is a path λ ∈ outM0(q0, s1) in the outcome set of the strategy, such that there is
no natural number i with M0, λ[i,∞] |= pos1. A “winning” strategy of 1 does not exist, because
agent 2 is not a member of the proponent coalition {1}, and 2 can prevent agent 1 from reaching
state q1 by performing the push action in q0 and the wait action in state q2. But we have that
M0, q0 |=IR 〈〈{1, 2}〉〉Fpos1: together, agents 1 and 2 have the ability to eventually guarantee to
make pos1 true.
4 We shall use I (resp. i) to refer to perfect (resp. imperfect) information. Analogously, we use R and
r in the context of memory.
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Often, agents have only incomplete information about the world. To model this, CGSs are
extended by indistinguishability relations between states, one per agent. Such a relation ∼a⊆
Q×Q for an agent a captures that two states in relation cannot be distinguished by agent a.CGSs
in the context of incomplete information are called incomplete information concurrent game
structures (ICGSs). Incomplete information also affects the notion of strategy. Not all strategies
are executable anymore. Intuitively, an agent must assign the same choice to indistinguishable
histories—there would be no justification if the agent chose different actions at situations which
appear identical to it. Such strategies are called uniform; formally, if histories h and h′ (i.e. finite
sequences of interconnected states) cannot be distinguished by a, written as h ≈a h′, then the
actions a strategy sa assigns to h and h
′ must be identical, i.e. sa(h) = sa(h′).
As mentioned above, logics such as ATL∗ can be used to specify properties of open systems.
For example, in the context of security it can be expressed that the security controller is able
to ensure that access is only granted to privileged users. The semantics of the logic captures
the capabilities of the agents, here of the security controller. Therefore, it is crucial that the
capabilities are captured accurately. It must be defined what the agents know about the model
and what computational power the agents have. For example, it can make a difference if the
security controller can only use a simple state based strategy to secure the system, or a more
complex strategy that takes into account all past events.
In this section we investigate formalisms that capture the different assumptions underlying
the agents’ decision making. Formally speaking, the different semantics yield possibly different
logics5 which in turn capture general properties of games. In Section 2.2 we investigate the
precise relation between different strategic logics. In Section 2.3 we argue that the standard
ATL∗ semantics can yield counterintuitive behaviors: agents forget past events even under the
assumption of perfect recall. We propose a new semantics and analyze its properties.
So far, the discussed logics are purely qualitative. They can express that some state of affairs
is reached or that all states satisfy a given property. These logics do not allow to reason about
quantitative aspects. Though, these aspects are inherent to many real-world settings and are also
crucial in the decision making of agents. Examples of systems which usually have a quantitative
dimension are resource bounded systems and systems in which actors have monetary objectives.
Objectives in smart grids, for example, can require to specify the actual power consumption,
or users monetary costs. In Section 2.4 we propose a quantitative extension of ATL∗. As a
consequence, agents are no longer restricted to purely qualitative objectives. They can have
objectives such as 〈〈1〉〉G(travel ∧ v1 ≥ 100) expressing that agent 1 can always travel and at the
same time has at least 100 Euro. The logic can also be used in combination with resource-bounded
systems or in settings in which agents take costs into consideration.
In Section 2.5 we propose an epistemic extension of the alternating µ-calculus, proposed
by Alur et al. [2002]. Our extension is appealing because it provides a new notion of strategy
and has—for a restricted setting—better computational properties than corresponding variants
of ATL∗ in the incomplete information setting.
Logics can essentially serve two main purposes: system modeling/specification/verification,
and reasoning. In both cases computational complexity [Papadimitriou, 1994] issues are crucial
for the logics applicability, perhaps even more if agents use logics for reasoning as they have to
(re)act in a timely manner. In Section 2.6 we identify (fragments of) logics for reasoning about
agents’ mental states that have good computational properties.
In the following sections we summarize the work of this section in more detail.
5 In this context, a logic is considered to be the set of all tautologies/valid sentences over a given
language together with a semantics and a class of models (semantic approach), or given a language
and an axiomatic system (syntactic approach) [Blackburn et al., 2001a].
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2.1 Logics for Reasoning About Strategic Abilities in Multi-Player
Games
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N., Goranko, V., and Jamroga, W. (2015). Logics for Reasoning About Strategic
Abilities in Multi-Player Games. In van Benthem, J., Ghosh, S., and Verbrugge, R.,
editors, Models of Strategic Reasoning, number 8972 in LNCS, pages 93–136. Springer
In this article we discuss formal methods for reasoning about strategic ability in multi-player
games. We review strategic games and effectivity functions which are abstract models of strategic
power of coalitions. An effectivity function E : 2Agt → 22Out assigns to a set A of agents a set
of sets of states, each of which encodes a set of outcomes group A is effective for. That is, if
X ∈ E(A) this means that agents A can ensure the outcome to be in X. In the paper we discuss
how effectivity functions and strategic games are related [Pauly, 2001a; Goranko et al., 2013].
Then, we proceed with concurrent game models and relate them to global effectivity models.
We introduce Coalition Logic [Pauly, 2001a,b] and ATL∗ [Alur et al., 1997, 1998, 2002]. Both
logics allow to model and to reason about strategic abilities of agents in one-step and multiple-
step games. Coalition logic is equivalent to the next-time fragment of ATL. We give an overview
of variants of ATL∗, for example ones in which agents are committed to their strategies, or
where strategic terms are part of the object language allowing to explicitly talk about specific
strategies. Thereafter, we survey logics to reason about games—in the game theoretical sense—
and to characterize game theoretical solution concepts. We also consider incomplete information
settings and present the most prominent epistemic extensions of ATL∗. We conclude reviewing
results on satisfiability and model checking of ATL∗. The contribution of this article is a survey
on strategic reasoning, focussing on ATL∗ and its variants.
2.2 Comparing Variants of Strategic Ability
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. and Jamroga, W. (2014). Comparing variants of strategic ability: how un-
certainty and memory influence general properties of games. Journal of Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 28(3):474–518
2.2.1 Strategies and Semantic Variants
The standard variants of ATL, as defined in [Alur et al., 1997, 2002], are based on perfect
information and perfect recall. This is reflected in the way strategies are defined, as functions
Q+ → Act. Given the notation above, we also write ATL∗IR to refer to (the standard variant of)
ATL∗. As already said, there are several other semantics proposed in the literature, for example
referring to agents’ observational capabilities [Schobbens, 2004; Jamroga and van der Hoek,
2004; van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2002, 2003; A˚gotnes, 2004; van Otterloo and Jonker, 2004;
A˚gotnes, 2006; Jamroga and A˚gotnes, 2007; Alur et al., 2002]; to the type of memory available
to agents to remember past events; or to the way agents can enforce properties—subjectively
or objectively. In order to ensure a uniform notation, following [Schobbens, 2004], we introduce
xy-strategies for x ∈ {is, io, I} and y ∈ {r,R} as follows:
IR: sa : Q
+ → Act such that sa(q0 . . . qn) ∈ d(a, qn) for all sequences q0 . . . qn;
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Ir: sa : Q→ Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q) for all q;
ior, isr: like Ir , with the additional constraint that q ∼a q′ implies sa(q) = sa(q′);
ioR, isR: like IR, with the additional constraint that h ≈a h′ implies sa(h) = sa(h′).
We note that r stands for memoryless strategies which can be represented by functions Q→ Act,
is indicates imperfect information under subjective ability, and io imperfect information under
objective ability. As before, a collective xy-strategy sA is a tuple of individual xy-strategies sa, one
per agent a ∈ A. We emphasize that isy- and ioy-strategies are defined in the very same way, only
the notion of outcome is different, as explained next. The difference between the objective and
subjective outcome, short io-outcome and is-outcome, respectively, affects the set of initial states
when constructing paths. In the former case the agent may not know that a uniform strategy
achieves the objective; following the given strategy, though, guarantees the objective objectively
possibly without the agent being aware of it. This can be interpreted as the perspective of an
external observer. In the subjective case, the agent knows about a potential winning strategy,
i.e. one that achieves the objective; the agent is able to identify and execute it.6 Hence, given
the current state q, the io-outcome considers only paths starting in q, whereas the is-outcome
considers paths also starting in those states q′ which are indistinguishable from q for the agents
at stake, i.e. all states q′ with q ∼A q′. Formally, we define the x-outcome with x ∈ {I, is, io} as:
outxM(q, sA) =
{⋃
q∼Aq′ outM(q
′, sA) if x = is;
outM(q, sA) else.
(2.2)
The general semantic relation |=xy with x ∈ {I, is, io} and y ∈ {r,R} is now defined by using
the appropriate notion of strategy and outcome:
M, q |=xy 〈〈A〉〉ϕ if, and only if, group A ⊆ Agt has a collective xy-strategy sA such that
on all paths λ ∈ outxM(q, sA) we have that M, λ |=xy ϕ.
2.2.2 The Different Logics and Validities
The different semantics give rise to (potentially) different logics such as:
ATL∗IR ATL
∗
Ir ATL
∗
isR
ATL∗ioR ATL
∗
isr
ATL∗ior
Variants of ATL are defined analogously. These logics capture specific capabilities of agents.
For example, ATL∗Ir assumes that agents have perfect information about the state of the world
but have no memory to store past observations: their decisions are based on the current—
perfectly identifiable—state only. The set of validities captures general properties of a class of
models/games. A formula ϕ is valid wrt. a class of models and a semantic relation, if ϕ holds in
all states in all models of the underlying class of models. Given a logic L for which the class of
models and the semantic relation is clear, we write ϕ ∈ L to denote that ϕ is a validity; hence,
we also identify L with the set of valid sentences. For example, let us consider the formula
ψ = 〈〈1〉〉Fp↔ p ∨ 〈〈1〉〉X〈〈1〉〉Fp.
It expresses that agent 1 can ensure that p holds eventually if, and only if, p is true now or agent 1
can ensure that in the next state, it can ensure that p holds eventually.7 We have that ψ ∈ ATLIR;
that is, over the class of (perfect information) concurrent game structures where agents have
6 For a detailed discussion, we refer to [Jamroga and van der Hoek, 2004; Bulling and Jamroga, 2014].
7 This formula is the fixed-point characterization of operator F. We will come back to this in Section 2.5.
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perfect recall, the fixed-point characterization ψ holds. Intuitively, the formula characterizes
the general property over the class of CGSs that agents can construct their strategies for Fp
incrementally. This property is not exclusive to ATLIR: it is also the case that ψ ∈ ATLIr. Actually,
from [Alur et al., 2002] it follows that both logics, ATLIr and ATLIR, share exactly the same general
properties, that is ATLIR = ATLIr. On the other hand, it is easy to give a counterexample showing
that ψ is not valid under incomplete information, ψ 6∈ ATL∗isR. A natural question to ask is how
exactly all these different variants of ATL are related to each other?
2.2.3 Comparison of Logics and General Properties
In the paper, we investigate this relation in detail. More precisely, given two logics L and L′ we
investigate whether L ( L′, L′ ( L, L = L′, or whether L and L′ are incomparable. In order to
prove that L ( L′ we first show that every L′-satisfiable formula is also L-satisfiable—proving that
L ⊆ L′. Then, we construct a formula ϕ ∈ L′ and a model M in which ϕ is not true at each state in
M wrt. the semantics of logic L. That is, we construct a counterexample. Often, the construction
of the counterexample seems to be the easier part, at least it seems so if the counter-example is
presented. The inclusion part is often more sophisticated. This holds especially if a logic which
assumes that agents have perfect recall is compared with one that assumes that agents have only
limited memory. Before turning to the more sophisticated case, we give an example illustrating
that ATL∗isr ⊂ ATL∗Ir.
To show that ATL∗isr ⊆ ATL∗Ir we observe that every model of ATL∗Ir—i.e. every (perfect
information) CGS—can be seen as a special ICGS where the epistemic links are assumed to
be reflexive loops only. Thus, every ATL∗Ir-satisfiable formula is also ATL
∗
isr
-satisfiable. Given
the duality of satisfiability and validity, this observation shows that ϕ ∈ ATL∗isr implies that
ϕ ∈ ATL∗Ir. For the strict inclusion, it remains to establish that ATL∗Ir 6⊆ ATL∗isr. Therefore,
we consider the formula ϕ = (p ∨ 〈〈a〉〉X〈〈a〉〉Fp) → 〈〈a〉〉Fp, the right-to-left direction of the
fixed-point characterization of the future-time operator F, which was already discussed above.
Under perfect information the formula is valid. This can be seen by combining the two witnessing
strategies associated with the two cooperation modalities in (p∨〈〈a〉〉X〈〈a〉〉Fp) to a single strategy
witnessing Fp. This is not possible under incomplete information, because after the first step
the agent may learn about the environment, possibly resolving epistemic limitations. The ICGS
Ms shown in Figure 2.2 illustrates this
8. We have that Ms, q0 |=isr win ∨ 〈〈a〉〉X〈〈a〉〉Fwin but
Ms, q0 6|=isr 〈〈a〉〉Fwin. In the former case, a first executes the look action, ending up in states
q4 and q5, respectively. In each of these states a, has a memoryless uniform winning strategy to
eventually reach state q2 and to win. However, there is no memoryless uniform strategy to reach
the state labelled win from state q0—the latter case. In our story
8, the man cannot directly guess
the right door. However, executing the look action would yield the loops (q0q4)
ω and (q1q5)
ω if
the initial state was q0 and q1, respectively, as the man is bound to memoryless strategies. The
result shows that the two logics characterise different general properties of agents.
The comparison of perfect recall and memoryless strategies under incomplete information is
more sophisticated. Under perfect information a pointed CGS (M, q), i.e. a model and a state in
it, can be unfolded to an infinite, bisimilar tree-shaped CGS T (M, q). As a tree does not contain
loops, memory does not matter and it follows that:
8 The story behind the model is as follows. A man a is in a game show and has to pick one of two doors.
The prize is behind one of them. State q0 (resp. q1) models that the prize is behind the left (resp. right)
door. The man does not know behind which one the prize is. Hence, q0 and q1 are indistinguishable
for a, q0 ∼a q1. However, he is able get a glimpse of the moderator’s notes to identify the correct door
(states q4 and q5). But the man is very nervous and cannot remember this in the next moment.
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Fig. 2.2. The ICGS |=s consists of one agent (a) and transitions labeled with a’s actions. The dotted
line depicts a’s indistinguishability relation. Automatic transitions (i.e., such that there is only one
possible transition from the starting state) are left unlabeled.
M, q |=IR ϕ if, any only if, T (M, q) |=Ir ϕ.
This shows that every ATLIR-satisfiable formula is also ATLIr-satisfiable, by taking the tree unfold-
ing of a satisfying model; hence, ATL∗Ir ⊆ ATL∗IR. The construction under incomplete information
follows the same procedure: First, appropriate tree-like structures on which memoryless and
perfect-recall strategies coincide are defined. Secondly, it is shown that a model can be unfolded
yielding such a tree-like structure. Thirdly, it is proven that the tree unfolding is truth-preserving
(i.e. a formula which is true in the original model is also true in the tree-like unfolding and vice
versa). The unfolding for imperfect information under objective ability is rather intuitive. Two
nodes h and h′ in the tree unfolding are indistinguishable for an agent a, if and only if, the his-
tories they represent are indistinguishable in the original model. The procedure for incomplete
information under subjective ability, however, requires a new, sophisticated tree-like structure
which we coin pando unfolding (as strictly speaking, it is not a tree). This is among the main
technical results of the paper.
2.2.4 Summary of the results
Using the methods described above, we show that over the class of all (finite and infinite) in-
complete information concurrent game structures most of the logics are indeed different, either
one is subsumed by another, or they are incomparable. An overview of the results for ATL∗ is
shown in Figure 2.3. The meaning of these results is threefold. Firstly, they are relevant from a
purely theoretical point of view, as logics are often considered as sets of validities. Secondly, as
already mentioned above, the results show that the logics characterize different general properties
of classes of games. Thirdly, it is a first step towards understanding the satisfiability problems
for variants of ATL∗ under incomplete information. To the best of our knowledge, satisfiability
results are only known for ATLIR and ATL
∗
IR [Goranko and van Drimmelen, 2006; Walther et al.,
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ATL⇤iorATL
⇤
isr
ATL⇤isR ATL
⇤
ioR
ATL⇤IR
ATL⇤Ir
Fig. 2.3. Comparison of validity sets induced by various semantics of ATL∗. Arrows depict strict sub-
sumption of validity sets. Dotted lines connect semantic variants with incomparable validity sets.
2006; Schewe, 2008; Goranko and Shkatov, 2009]. Among the main technical contributions of this
work is a (sophisticated) tree-like unfolding, the pando unfolding, in the context of subjective
incomplete information and perfect recall. We show that the unfolding is truth preserving.
2.3 Agents With Truly Perfect Recall
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N., Jamroga, W., and Popovici, M. (2014). ATL* with truly perfect recall:
Expressivity and validities. In Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence (ECAI 2014), volume 263 of Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence
and Applications, pages 177–182, Prague, Czech Republic. IOS Press
The logic ATL∗iR, discussed in Section 2.2, allows to model abilities of agents with perfect recall
and incomplete information. In particular, this means that agents remember all past events and
can take them into consideration when taking decisions. We show that this semantics can be
counterintuitive in the context of incomplete information and perfect recall: agents may forget
past events although it is assumed that they have perfect recall. This is best illustrated by an
example. Consider the ICGS M1 shown in Figure 2.4 modeling a simplified version of a shell
game. Our version of the shell game consists of two players, the shuﬄer s and the guesser g. In
state q0 the shuﬄer places a ball in the left or the right shell, modeled by actions putL and putR,
respectively. At the beginning in q0, the shells are open, and the guesser can see the location of
the ball. If the shuﬄer turns the shells over, the ball will become hidden; actually, this is the
only choice that he has in q0. Thus, the guesser cannot distinguish the states q2 and q
′
2, which
is modeled by q2 ∼g q′2. It is important to note that epistemic relations capture observational
limitations only and not the evolving knowledge of agents. This is also an important distinction
between the computational and the behavioral structure of a model. The guesser wins if he picks
up the shell containing the ball. Even this very simple example is rich enough to highlight the
following limitations of ATL∗iR:
2.3 Agents With Truly Perfect Recall 13
q0q1 q′1
q2 q′2
q3
win q
′
3
g
(c
lo
se
,n
o
p
)
(c
lo
se
,n
o
p
)
(putL,nop) (putR,nop)
(n
o
p
,p
ic
k
L
)
(nop,pick
R)
(n
o
p
,p
ic
k
L
)
(n
op
,pi
ckR
)
Fig. 2.4. The ICGS M1 describes a variant of a shell game. Tuples (α1, α2), e.g. (putL,nop), represent
the action profiles. α1 denotes an action of player s—the shuﬄer—and action α2 of player g—the guesser.
The dotted line represents g’s indistinguishability relation; reflexive loops are omitted. State q3 is labelled
with the only proposition win. For example, when the guesser plays action pickR in state q2 the game
proceeds to state q′3. nop indicates the “do nothing” action.
• On the one hand, the guesser has a strategy to win against all moves of the shuﬄer s:
M1, q0 |=iR 〈〈g〉〉Fwin. This is so, because s has perfect information about q0. Due to the
semantics of ATL∗iR and as there are no nested cooperation modalities the epistemic link
between q2 and q
′
2 is irrelevant. Intuitively, while playing the game the shuﬄer learns to
distinguish q2 and q
′
2.
• On the other hand, the shuﬄer has a strategy to enforce that the guesser will not be able
to enforce that he wins: M1, q0 |=iR 〈〈s〉〉F¬〈〈g〉〉Fwin. This is clearly counterintuitive to the
previous property. Here, it is important to note that if a formula of type 〈〈A〉〉ϕ is interpreted
in a state q, then all states indistinguishable from q for A must be taken into consideration as
well. In the specific example, if 〈〈g〉〉Fwin is evaluated in q2 then the formula is also evaluated
in q′2 being an epistemic alternative of q2. Intuitively, during the play the shuﬄer learns to
distinguish q2 and q
′
2 but in case of nested cooperation modalities the shuﬄer forgets what
he has learnt.
This problem is due to the way nested modalities are treated in the semantics of ATL∗iR, and
indeed all other variants of ATL considered so far. As the example showed, when evaluating a
subformula 〈〈A〉〉ψ the group A “forgets” what has happened so far.
The no-forgetting semantics which we propose in the paper resolves this counter-intuitive
behavior. In the example, in q2 or q
′
2 the agents remember whether the very state has been
reached via state q1 or q
′
1, respectively. As a consequence, in the new semantics we have
that ¬〈〈s〉〉F〈〈g〉〉Fwin in q0 because the two histories q0q1q2 and q0q′1q′2—now remembered by
the guesser—are distinguishable and are taken into account when evaluating the subformula
〈〈g〉〉Fwin.
Formally, the no-forgetting semantics is defined by the relation9 |=nfx , x ∈ {i, I}, again for
the perfect (I) and imperfect information (i) cases, where i corresponds to subjective ability in
terms of Section 2.2. Differently from above, formulae are interpreted over triples consisting of a
model, a history/path and an index k ∈ N0 which identifies the current state on the path. The
subhistory of a path λ up to k, denoted by λ[0, k − 1], encodes the past; the subpath starting
9 We omit a capital R as the semantics is only defined for perfect recall strategies.
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after k, denoted by λ[k + 1,∞], the future; and the state at the kth position, λ[k], the current
state. The crucial part of this semantics is that the agents can learn from past events encoded
in λ[0, k − 1]. The semantic clauses are defined as follows:
M, λ, k |=nfx p iff λ[k] ∈ Π(p) for p ∈ Π;
M, λ, k |=nfx ¬ϕ iff M, λ, k 6|=nfx ϕ;
M, λ, k |=nfx ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, λ, k |=nfx ϕ1 and M, λ, k |=nfx ϕ2;
M, λ, k |=nfx 〈〈A〉〉ϕ iff there exists an xR-strategy sA such that, for all paths λ′ ∈ playsxM(λ[0, k], sA),
M, λ′, k |=nfx ϕ;
M, λ, k |=nfx Xϕ iff M, λ, k + 1 |=nfx γ
M, λ, k |=nfx ϕ1Uϕ2 iff there exists i ≥ k such that M, λ, i |=nfx ϕ2 and M, λ, j |=nfx ϕ1 for all
k ≤ j < i.
where
playsxM(h, sA) =
{⋃
h≈Ah′{h′ ◦ λ | outxM(h′[last ], sA)} for x = i
{h ◦ λ | outxM(h[last ], sA)} for x = I
, (2.3)
h[last ] refers to the last state of history h, respectively, and h ◦ λ denotes the concatenation
of history h and path λ. Given a state formula ϕ and a history h, we write M, h |=nfx ϕ iff
M, λ, k |=nfx ϕ for any path λ ∈ Λ with λ[0, k] = h. We coin the resulting logics ATL?nf,x for
x ∈ {i, I}. Note that playsxM(·, ·) is very similar to outxM(·, ·), but it keeps track of past events;
paths do no longer only encode the future.
We reconsider our example in a more formal way and show thatM1, q0 |=nfi ¬〈〈s〉〉F¬〈〈g〉〉Fwin.
That is, for any strategy of shuﬄer s there is a path such that in all states on it, g can ensure
to eventually win. In particular, player g can ensure to reach the winning state q3 from state
q2 as well as from q
′
2. To see this, suppose player s decided to reach state q2 via history q0q1q2
(the other case is symmetric). Then, playsi(q0q1q2, sg) = {q0q1q2qω3 } where sg is the (uniform)
strategy selecting pickL after q0q1q2—note the difference to out
is(q2, sg) which contains two
different paths10. Clearly, we have that M1, q0q1q2 |=nfi 〈〈g〉〉Fwin.
The example suggests that the new semantics allows to express properties which are not
expressible in the standard semantics. In the paper we investigate the precise relation between
the logics’ expressive and distinguishing power, as well as the general properties they describe,
in the sense of Section 2.2. Expressiveness refers to the logic’s power to characterize specific
properties over a class of models, for example the reflexivity of models. Distinguishing power
refers to the capability to distinguish specific models; here, the formula may not be the same
across all models but can be specific to the models under consideration. We note that if a logic
is more expressive than another one, then the same holds for the logic’s distinguishing power;
the converse is not necessarily true.
Unsurprisingly, both semantics are equivalent under perfect information. Thus, the logics
ATL?I and ATL
?
nf,I are equally expressive, have the same distinguishing power, and have the same
set of validities (ATL?I = ATL
?
nf,I). Secondly, we consider incomplete information. We show that
the logics ATL?i and ATL
?
nf,i have incomparable distinguishing and expressive powers. To show
that ATL?nf,i is no more distinguishing than ATL
?
i we consider the two models shown in Figure 2.5.
There is no ATL?nf,i-formula that can distinguish (M3, a0) from (M
′
3, a0). It is easy to observe
that the only way to distinguish both pointed models would be to evaluate a state formula in
states a1 or b1. The paths that start in (M3, a0) are identical to those that start in (M
′
3, a0).
Moreover, in both models all histories that pass through a1 are distinguishable from those that
10 Note that in this case sg(q2) = sg(q
′
2) = pickL.
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Fig. 2.5. M3 (resp. M
′
3) is the iCGS shown on the left-hand-side (resp. right-hand-side) of the Figure.
pass through b1, because the former start in a0 while the latter start in b0. Thus, there is no
way that a formula can distinguish the pointed models under the no-forgetting semantics. But
both models can be distinguished by ATL?i : M3, a0 |=i 〈〈1〉〉X〈〈2〉〉Xwin and M′3, a0 6|=i 〈〈1〉〉X〈〈2〉〉
Xwin. In the latter case player 2 “forgets” that the game started in state a0 when the nested
cooperation modality is evaluated. In M′3 the player cannot distinguish state a1 from b1 when
evaluating the nested formula and there is no uniform strategy winning from a1 as well as from
b1 in M
′
3. The reasoning that ATL
?
I is no more distinguishing than ATL
?
nf,I follows the same
lines but the two models are slightly more sophisticated. Although both logics are incomparable
regarding expressive and distinguishing power, they are comparable on the level of validities: the
logic ATL?nf,i defines a more specific class of games than ATL
?
i ; we have that ATL
?
i ( ATL
?
nf,i.
In summary, the main contributions of the paper are the following:
• We propose a no-forgetting semantics for ATL∗, fixing a conceptually counter-intuitive be-
havior.
• We show that the new and old semantics coincide for perfect information.
• We show that both semantics have incomparable expressive and distinguishing power under
incomplete information.
• In the context of validities, we show that the no-forgetting semantics describes a more specific
class of games (games in which players do not forget past events).
2.4 Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Reasoning
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. and Goranko, V. (2013). How to be both rich and happy: Combining quan-
titative and qualitative strategic reasoning about multi-player games (extended ab-
stract). In Proc. of the 1st International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning, EPTCS,
pages 33–41, Rome, Italy
ATL∗ and its variants are purely qualitative, allowing to reason about qualitative objectives.
There are only a few extensions of ATL∗ that we know of which include quantitative aspects,
e.g. resource-bounded settings proposed in [Bulling and Farwer, 2010; Alechina et al., 2011;
Della Monica et al., 2011]. However, in the domain of infinite games quantitative aspects play
a prominent role, e.g. in deterministic or stochastic infinite games on graphs [de Alfaro et al.,
2007], [Chatterjee et al., 2011], [Chatterjee and Henzinger, 2012]; in purely quantitative repeated
16 2 Reasoning about Strategic Aspects in Decision Making
games; in stochastic games with quantitative objectives [Peters and Vrieze, 1987]; and in mean-
payoff and energy parity games [Chatterjee et al., 2005], [Chatterjee and Doyen, 2012], [Bohy
et al., 2013]. In general, quantitative aspects are especially important in classical decision making
where agents want to maximize their expected utility. In our work we combine both traditions
and propose Quantitative ATL∗, QATL∗ in short.
In the following we briefly review the logical setting. Firstly, we fix a simple language of
arithmetic constraints which is built over variables VAgt = {va | a ∈ Agt} referring to accumulated
payoffs of the players at a given state. An arithmetic constraint is of type t1 ∗ t2 where ∗ ∈ {<,
≤,=,≥, >} and each arithmetic term ti is essentially constructed from VAgt allowing addition.
For example, v1 + v2 ≥ v3 expresses that the sum of the accumulated payoffs of agents 1 and 2
is greater or equal to the accumulated payoff of agent 3. We also allow Boolean combinations of
such arithmetic constraints. The language of QATL∗ extends ATL∗ with such arithmetic constraint
formulae ac:
ϕ ::= p | ac | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ and γ ::= ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | Xγ | Gγ | γUγ.
The logic allows to express strategic properties over qualitative as well as quantitative statements.
A typical formula is 〈〈1, 2〉〉F(p ∧ v1 > 100 ∧ v2 > 100), expressing that coalition {1, 2} can
eventually guarantee p and to receive (at the same state) an accumulated payoff of more than
100 each. Models of the logic extend CGSs with payoffs. Each transition—corresponding to
an action profile—is associated with a set of payoffs, one for each agent. A global state is a
configuration consisting of the system state and a tuple of accumulated payoffs, one for each
agent. Additionally, each state is assigned a guard which can enable and disable specific actions
and thus transitions, depending on the agents’ accumulated payoffs. For instance, it could be
specified that specific actions are only enabled for those players that have a positive accumulated
payoff. The general setting can be restricted in many ways affecting the computational properties
of the logic.
The payoffs associated with each action profile allow to consider the new model as a guarded
CGS in which each state is assigned a normal form game. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6. The
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(D ,C )
(D ,D )
(C ,C )
(C ,C )
(D ,D )
(C ,D )
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(C ,C )
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(C ,D )
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I \ II C D
C 2, 2 − 3, 3
D 3, − 3 − 1, − 1
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I \ II C D
C 4, 3 0, 2
D − 1, − 2 2, 3
Battle of Sexes
I \ II C D
C 1, 1 − 1, − 1
D − 1, − 1 1, 1
Coordination Game
Fig. 2.6. A simple guarded CGS with payoffs.
model consists of 2 players, I and II, and 3 states, where at each state each player has 2 possible
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actions: C (cooperate) and D (defect). The normal form games associated with the states are
versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma at state s1, Battle of the Sexes at state s2 and Coordination
Game at state s3, respectively. The guards at each state for both players are identical: a player
can apply any action if it has a positive current accumulated payoff; may only apply action C
if it has accumulated payoff 0; and must play an action maximizing its minimum payoff in the
current game if the accumulated payoff is negative. The initial payoffs of both players are 0.
In this setting, a strategy can take into account the accumulated payoff of a player, of
other players, and of states and history. The only constraint is that the choices assigned
by a strategy need to respect the guards, meaning that a chosen strategy must be enabled
at the very state. The used notion of strategy affects the complexity and decidability of
the logic, in particular, with respect to model checking. In our example from Figure 2.6 a
possible strategy for both players could be to always cooperate, yielding the outcome path
(s1, 0, 0), (s1, 2, 2), (s1, 4, 4), . . .. Each tuple consists of the state of the model, the accumulated
payoff of player I in that state and the one of player II, respectively. Another strategy could
be to cooperate in the first round and then to defect. The play continues to s2, where player
I chooses to defect whereas II cooperates. Then I must cooperate while II must defect, due to
the definition of the guards. In the next round I can choose any action. Thus a possible play is:
(s1, 0, 0), (s1, 2, 2), (s2, 1, 1), (s2, 0,−1), (s2, 0, 1), (s2, 0, 3), (s2, 0, 5), . . . QATL∗ can now be used to
reason about players’ ability in a qualitative and quantitative way. For example, in configuration
(s1, 0, 0) the following two formulae hold where pi is an atomic proposition true only at state si,
for each i = 1, 2, 3: 〈〈{I, II}〉〉F(p1 ∧ vI > 100 ∧ vII > 100) ∧ 〈〈{I, II}〉〉XX〈〈{II}〉〉(G(p2 ∧ vI =
0) ∧ F vII > 100) and ¬〈〈{I}〉〉G(p1 ∨ vI > 0) ∧ ¬〈〈{I, II}〉〉F(p3 ∧G(p3 ∧ (vI + vII > 0))).
Unsurprisingly, the models are too rich and the language of QATL∗ is too expressive to expect
good computational properties and even decidability of model checking as well as satisfiability
checking in the general case. We consider first results about the (un)decidability of the logical
framework. Our main contributions are:
• Proposal of Quantitative ATL∗ and quantitative extension of CGSs.
• An approach combining three areas: logic, game theory, and computer science.
• First (un)decidability result.
2.5 Alternating-Time Epistemic µ-Calculus
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. and Jamroga, W. (2011). Alternating epistemic mu-calculus. In IJCAI 2011,
Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16-22, 2011, pages 109–114, Barcelona, Spain.
IJCAI/AAAI
An important feature of ATL∗ and ATL under perfect information are the fixed-point formulae
characterizing properties of the temporal operators. For example, for the “now or sometime in
the future” operator F the characterization 〈〈A〉〉Fp↔ p∨〈〈A〉〉X〈〈A〉〉Fp holds: A can eventually
enforce p if, and only if, p is true now or A can ensure that in the next moment A can ensure
that p holds nor or in the future. Such a characterization allows to decompose complex strategic
reasoning into a simpler reasoning; put another way, strategies can be constructed step-by-step.
This is important especially for efficient model checking algorithms. These characterizations do
usually not hold for imperfect information variants of ATL∗, as already illustrated in Section 2.2.
Conceptually, this also means that having a strategy to achieve ϕ does not imply that the
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agents will be able to recompute a (or the) winning strategy while executing it. Motivated by
this observation we add fixed-point operators to the “next-time” fragment of ATLiR; or put
differently, we consider an epistemic extension of the alternating µ-calculus (AMC) proposed
by Alur et al. [2002]. Consistent with the notations used above, we call the logic alternating
epistemic µ-calculus (AMCi) and study its properties. The logic is defined as:
ϕ ::= p | X | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | 〈A〉ϕ | µX(ϕ) | Kaϕ
where A ⊆ Agt, p ∈ Π, X is a variable ranging over sets of states and each ϕ in µX(ϕ) is
X-positive, i.e. each free occurrence of X in ϕ is under the scope of an even number of negations
in ϕ. Operator µX(ϕ) is the least fixed-point operator. To define the semantics formally, we need
the notion of valuation which is a function V : Var → 2Q. It assigns to a variable X the states
in which X is true. Given a variable X and a set Z ⊆ Q of states we define
V[X := Z](Y ) =
{
V(Y ) if X 6= Y ;
Z else.
That is, the valuation V[X := Z] equals V for all variables different from X and assigns Z to X.
Truth of AMCi-formulae is given by the denotation function [[·]]MV that maps AMCi-formulae to the
sets of states satisfying the formula (i.e. [[ϕ]]MV ⊆ Q) where M is an ICGS and V is a valuation.
Now, the semantics of the least fixed-point operator is the least fixed-point of the function
f : 2Q → 2Q with f(Z) = [[µX(ϕ)]]MV[X:=Z]. The fixed-point operator is very expressive and
allows to define the standard temporal operators under perfect information [Alur et al., 2002].
For example, 〈〈A〉〉Fψ can be defined as µX(ψ ∨ 〈A〉X). It is well-known that the alternation-
free fragment of the AMC is more expressive than ATLIR, where the alternation-free fragment
imposes restrictions on the construction of AMC-formulae. In this work we study the relation
under incomplete information where the semantics of the cooperation modality is given as follow:
[[〈A〉ϕ]]MV = {q | ∃sA ∈ ΣirA ∀λ = q0q1 . . . ∈ outir(q, sA)(q1 ∈ [[ϕ]]MV )}
where ΣirA denotes the set of collective ir-strategies of group A, and of the knowledge operator
as
[[Kaϕ]]
M
V = {q | ∀q′(q ∼a q′ implies q′ ∈ [[ϕ]]MV )}.
That is, [[〈A〉ϕ]]MV is the set of states from which agents A have a collective uniform strategy to
enforce a state in which ϕ holds in the next moment.
To illustrate the logic we consider the two models shown in Figure 2.7. The story behind
model M is as follows : A robot is in its initial position (q0) and needs to find its way to its
destination state q2 labelled p. To reach the destination the robot needs to cross a tunnel in
which it has no connection to the base (q1) and can thus not access its stored planning data. In
the tunnel the robot can only rely on its imprecise GPS signal. As a result, it does not know
whether its exact location is q1 or q
′
1. Only q1 allows the robot to reach the destination q2.
We have that M, q0 |=ir 〈〈robot〉〉Fp, so the robot has a plan to reach the destination. It
knows now that everything will be fine, but it also knows that it will loose the connection on
the way, which may prevent the robot from reaching its destination. The stronger kind of ability
is captured by the alternation-free AMCi-formula µX(p ∨ 〈robot〉X), which is not true in M, q0.
The minimal fixed-point of the formula is {q2}. The reason is that there is no uniform strategy
in q1 which subjectively ensures to end up in a state where p holds: from the robot’s perspective
state q′1 is an epistemic alternative to q1.
The example suggests that there are some properties expressible in the alternation-free AMCi
which are not expressible in ATLir. Indeed, this is the case. Surprisingly however, it is not the case
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Fig. 2.7. Models M and N, each with a single agent 1.
that the new logic is strictly more expressive than ATLir. We prove that AMCi is incomparable
in expressive power to ATLir as well as to ATLiR. Actually, the models M and N from Figure 2.7
cannot be distinguished by AMCi but they can by ATLir. Thus, we obtain a new notion of strategic
ability not expressible in standard epistemic variants of ATL.
We also analyse the model checking complexity of the new logic. We prove that for a restricted
case of groups of up to two agents, the alternation-free AMCi has better computational properties
than its corresponding variant of ATL under incomplete information. This can be important for
settings in which only two agents act together at the same time, which is, for example, often the
case in the analysis of security protocols. In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• We propose an epistemic variant of AMC, called AMCi.
• We show that the alternation-free fragment of AMCi is incomparable to ATLir and ATLiR.
• We give characterizations of new strategic properties.
• We also prove that model checking the alternation-free fragment of AMCi can be done in
polynomial time for small coalitions; for larger groups of agents, the verification complexity
is in ∆P2 , as for ATLir.
2.6 Taming the Complexity of Linear Time BDI Logics
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. and Hindriks, K. V. (2011). Taming the complexity of linear time BDI log-
ics. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2011), pages 275–282, Taipei, Taiwan. ACM Press
Among the main application areas of logic, especially temporal and strategic logic, are system
modeling/specification/verification [Clarke et al., 1999; Baier and Katoen, 2008; Bulling et al.,
2010] and automated reasoning [Fisher, 2008; Fisher et al., 2005; Bulling et al., 2015; Fagin et al.,
1995a]. A challenge is to cope with the high computational complexity that is often involved when
dealing with logic. The complexity is especially crucial in the context of automated reasoning.
When agents use logical methods for reasoning, the computational complexity of satisfiability
checking is important as agents have to react in time. Agents’ mental states play a decisive role in
the reasoning cycle: agents have to reason about other agents’ beliefs, desires and intentions, in
particular when working in teams they need to reason about other agents’ mental states [Dunin-
Keplicz and Verbrugge, 2006]. The same holds for establishing joint commitments [Jennings,
1993; Cohen et al., 1997], and to collaborate/cooperate with others [Jennings, 1993; Tambe, 1997;
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Cohen et al., 1997; Dunin-Keplicz and Verbrugge, 2006]. Socio-cognitive robotics and human-
robot teamwork are other areas where reasoning about mental states and social behavior is
essential [Kennedy et al., 2009]. In principle, logical approaches are capable to be used for these
tasks but in practice little use is made of them [Cohen et al., 1997; Rao, 1996; Dziubinski et al.,
2007]. Arguably, one reason is the logics’ inherent complexity which has been well studied for
logics of time and knowledge. In this work we propose a logic which is, on one hand, expressive
enough to be used for reasoning about agents’ mental states and, on the other hand, has “good”
computational properties. For the latter case, we investigate restrictions on the general setting.
Our work is based on BDILTL [Rao, 1996]. The logic provides means to talk about linear-time,
as well as informational and motivational attitudes of agents. The latter are captured by modal
operators for beliefs, desires and intentions. Formulae of the logic are built according to the
grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕUϕ | Xϕ | Biϕ | Diϕ | Iiϕ
where i refers to an agent from Agt. The temporal operators U and X have their standard inter-
pretation. Biϕ, Diϕ, and Iiϕ expresses that agent i believes, desires, and intends ϕ, respectively.
Operators can also be nested to talk about other agents’ mental states. For example, the formula
BiBjXIkp specifies that agent i believes that agent j believes that in the next moment agent k
intends p. One cannot expect the complexity of satisfiability checking BDILTL to be lower than
for the modal and temporal logics BDILTL is comprised of. So, a good starting point is to analyse
existing complexity results and whether they can be applied to the proposed setting. In [Halpern
and Moses, 1992] the complexity of single- and multi-agent logics for knowledge and belief are
studied. Depending on the properties of the modal operators and the number of agents the results
range from NP- to PSPACE-completeness, and even EXPTIME-completeness in the case of
common knowledge. Also, Ladner’s theorem [Blackburn et al., 2001b] provides bounds on the
complexity for modal logics between K and S4; they are PSPACE-complete. So, in the general
setting one cannot hope for better complexity results. However, it has been shown that bounding
the number of propositional variables or the nesting depth of modal operators can yield logics
with better computational properties. In particular, if both restrictions are imposed on the logic
satisfiability checking could be done in linear time. In Table 2.1 we give an overview of the various
complexity results. We use md ≤ c, c ∈ N0, to denote the restriction to formulae, the nesting
of modal operators of which is bounded by c. We use |Π| to denote the number of propositions.
The first cell of a row is understood as a constraint, e.g. |Π| ≤ c, md ≤ c′ characterizes the case
in which the number of propositions and the modal depth is bounded by natural numbers c and
c′, respectively.
K45,KD45,S5 K,KDn,K45n,KD45n,S5n
no constraints NP-compl. PSPACE-compl.
|Π| ≤ c linear time PSPACE-compl.
md ≤ c NP-compl. NP-compl.
|Π| ≤ c, md ≤ c′ linear time linear time
Table 2.1. Overview of complexity of satisfiability checking for multi-agent modal logics.
Similar results exist for the temporal fragment of BDILTL. The temporal logic LTL has a
PSPACE-complete satisfiability problem. Restricted settings can be obtained as before by re-
stricting the number of propositions or the depth of the temporal nesting (denoted by td); addi-
tionally, the available temporal operators can be restricted [Demri and Schnoebelen, 1997]. An
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overview of some complexity results is given in Table 2.2. Combinations of time and knowledge
LTL LTL(U)
|Π| ≤ c, td ≤ c′ L L
td=0 NP-compl. NP-compl.
|Π| = 1 PSPACE-compl. P
td = 2 PSPACE-compl. PSPACE-compl.
Table 2.2. Overview of complexity of satisfiability checking for temporal logics. We denote by LTL(U)
the fragment with U being the only temporal operator.
have been analysed in [Halpern and Vardi, 1989]. BDILTL allows for modal operators with proper-
ties different from classical knowledge, i.e. S5. Therefore, we investigate generic variants BDIX,Y,ZLTL
where X,Y,Z ∈ {K,KD,KD45,S4,S5}. For example, the logic BDIS5,KD,KDLTL combines knowledge
(S5), consistent desires (KD), and consistent intentions (KD). Models of BDILTL are given by
interpreted systems [Fagin et al., 1995b] including an accessibility relation over points (r,m), i.e.
an infinite sequence of states r—a run—and a time point m on r, for each of the modal opera-
tors in addition to a temporal accessibility relation. The semantic clause for Bϕi is, for example,
defined as follows:
M, r,m |= Biϕ iff M, r′,m′ |= ϕ for all (r′,m′) with (r,m)Bi(r′,m′).
Biϕ expresses that agent i believes ϕ in (r,m) if, and only if, ϕ holds in all points (r
′,m′)
which i believes to be an alternative to (r,m). In the work we aim at identifying fragments of
BDILTL which are expressive enough to allow reasoning about mental states and which have an
“acceptable” complexity. Given that we can often not avoid propositional reasoning we consider
NP as acceptable complexity class. In line with the discussion above we identify the following
fragments of BDILTL which may still be in NP:
• the fragment with finitely many propositional atoms, limited temporal depth, and bounded
nesting of other modal operators representing mental attitudes, and
• the fragment with no nesting of temporal operators and bounded nesting of other modal
operators representing mental attitudes.
In the paper, we describe a generic tableau-based method for deciding the satisfiability of
BDIX,Y,ZLTL -formulae. That is, the tableau procedure takes into account the specific instantiations
of X, Y, and Z. We show that the tableau-procedure is sound and complete and that it is
PSPACE-complete in the general setting. Additionally, we analyse a restricted setting which
is NP-complete, and another one that can be solved in deterministic logarithmic space. Apart
from the complexity results we also postulate minimality criteria that a logic for reasoning about
agents’ mental states should satisfy. In summary, our main contributions are:
• A generic sound tableaux-based satisfiability procedure for BDILTL.
• Complexity results for various fragments of BDILTL which range from L to PSPACE.
• Analysis of requirements for logics for reasoning about agents’ mental states.

3Coordination and Control of Multi-Agent Decision Making
In Chapter 2 we considered strategic logics, in particular variants of ATL, to describe, specify
and verify MASs [Baier and Katoen, 2008; Bulling et al., 2010; Clarke et al., 1999], and to reason
about strategic abilities of agents [Bulling et al., 2015; Fagin et al., 1995a; van Benthem et al.,
2015]. The logics have a descriptive flavor; they do not provide immediate means to change a
system’s state or the behavior of agents. This is sufficient when one wants to verify whether a
system satisfies a property. But what to do, if the answer is negative?
In smart grids the activities of electricity producers need to be coordinated. In case electricity
plants are part of the same company this means to essentially implement control strategies. If
the production takes place at different companies or at the customer side (they may have their
own solar modules and inject electricity into the smart grid) the diverse interests have to be
taken into consideration. Regulations or incentives may be needed to influence the stakeholders’
activities to ensure a reliable and stable power supply. Flexible tariffs can be used to incentivize
customers to change their profile accordingly. Clearly, there are limits to the customers’ willing-
ness or possibilities to change their behavior. Also, the behavior of the customers need to be
monitored. Smart meters are used to record the users’ power consumption. This information has
to be analysed to develop appropriate control strategies, including the prediction of the expected
power consumption. In this section we investigate formal methods to analyse whether agents
can be incentivized to change their behavior, and also whether violations of regulations will be
monitored. We investigate formal tools to influence the decision making of agents and thus to
actually change the emerging behavior of a MAS.
One approach we consider is based on normative multi-agent systems (NORMASs) [Boella
et al., 2006; Andrighetto et al., 2013]. Jones and Sergot [1993], Shoham and Tennenholtz [1992,
1995], and Moses and Tennenholz [1995] have already proposed norms and social laws as means
to coordinate (social) systems. A classical example of a norm is the traffic law “right has right-
of-way” which coordinates traffic. Starting with this work, logical approaches have been used to
model and to reason about norms and their effects [van der Hoek et al., 2007; A˚gotnes et al.,
2007, 2009; Wooldridge and van der Hoek, 2005; Bulling and Dastani, 2011]. In this chapter we
investigate how the behavior of agents in NORMASs can be controlled and coordinated by means
of formal and game theoretical methods.
In Section 3.1 we propose an approach based on mechanism design and social choice the-
ory [Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] to analyze whether a
given set of norms is sufficient to influence the agents’ behaviors in such a way that a desirable
system behavior emerges. Often, sanctioning mechanisms need to be installed to handle norm
violations. However, before norm violations can be sanctioned they have to be detected. If there
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is a law prohibiting over-speeding, but there are no speed cameras, the law will probably have
little effect. Hence, it is necessary to have an efficient monitor infrastructure that allows to ob-
serve the system and detect norm violations. This is the subject of Section 3.2. We propose a
formal, logic-based model of monitors and analyze its properties.
Finally, we consider the aspect of responsibility. If norm violations or any kind of (mis)behavior
is detected it is necessary to determine the agents that are responsible for it, in order to take ap-
propriate measures including the sanctioning of norm violating agents. Especially in the setting of
joint/simultaneous actions this is a challenging task and relates to collective responsibility [Smi-
ley, 2011; Grossi et al., 2007; Bulling and Dastani, 2013]. We address this problem in Section 3.3
where we propose a formal modelling of responsibility in a strategic context.
3.1 Verifying Normative Behavior via Normative Mechanism Design
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. and Dastani, M. (2011). Verification and implementation of normative
behaviours in multi-agent systems. In IJCAI 2011, Proceedings of the 22nd Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July
16-22, 2011, pages 103–108, Barcelona, Spain. IJCAI/AAAI
MASs are designed for specific purposes and the emerging system behavior should meet those.
However, as agents are autonomous and self interested they do not necessarily care about the
system objective. Even if they cared there often would be a need for the coordination of action
execution/selection in order to obtain a desirable behavior. In this work we analyze how to influ-
ence the behavior of self-interested agents in such a way that the system specification is actually
met. We follow a normative approach. As said above, norms have already been proven suitable
to change/control agents’ behavior [Dastani et al., 2009a,b; Esteva et al., 2004; Jones and Sergot,
1993], in particular also using logical approaches [A˚gotnes and Wooldridge, 2010; A˚gotnes et al.,
2007]. The work is also motivated by the rule-based Organisation Oriented Programming Lan-
guage (2OPL) which allows to implement normative environments using norms and sanctioning
mechanisms [Dastani et al., 2009a,b].
Given this practical context our modeling starts from a set of action specifications and an
initial state. If successively applied the action specifications generate a CGS as discussed in
Section 2. To model a MAS, we additionally assume that agents have goals and preferences. This
is modeled by LTL-formulae. More precisely, an agent has a list of LTL-formulae each of which is
associated a utility value. These formulae induce a utility value for each path in the model. The
path is assigned the highest value of those formulae satisfied in the list. As complete strategy
profiles yield a unique path in the model, a utility value can be assigned to each strategy profile.
Rational agents try to maximize their payoffs and act accordingly. This can be formalized by
defining a strategic game from a given CGS extended with goals of agents. The construction is
similar to the transformation of an extensive form game to a strategic game, well-known from
the game theory literature. We simply enumerate all strategy profiles in the CGS and evaluated
LTL-formulae to compute the payoff of each agent for a given strategy profile. As a consequence,
the game theoretical machinery can be applied to our setting.
In this paper, we are concerned with how the behavior of agents can be influenced/coordinated
such that the outcome of their acting is aligned with the objective of the system. Per se, the
agents try to find the best strategy with respect to their individual goals; they care little, if
at all, about other agents’ goals or the system objective. To investigate this problem we use
ideas from mechanism design and social choice theory [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Shoham
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and Leyton-Brown, 2009]. An overview of the setting is given in Figure 3.1. First, we define
norms
+
sanctions
agents
agents' goalsgoals of MAS
 actions
action selection according 
to rationality criterium
f : Agents Prefs ! Outcomes
coordinate behavior
How to    -implement   ?f
S
S
Fig. 3.1. Overview of normative mechanism design.
a normative behavior function f as a function f : Prefs → LTL to specify the desired system
objective f(γ1, . . . , γk) for a given vector of preferences of the agents, containing a preference list
γi for each agent i. That is, depending on the agents’ preferences the system designer specifies
the desired system property by means of an LTL-formula. Note that the system designer is
not forced to take the agents’ preferences into account. Just as well, the system designer could
define f as a constant function. Often, however, the system designer is not aware of the specific
objectives of an agent such that a social choice function can be used to ensure that the outcome
is desirable with respect to all possible preferences. Second, we assume that agents act rationally
according to some game theoretical solution concept S, and compute the equilibria according
to the preferences γ1, . . . , γk in the associated strategic game obtained from the CGS and the
preferences as explained above. Third, we check whether the equilibria satisfy f(γ1, . . . , γk).
If this is the case, we are in a good position: if the agents act rationally and an appropriate
equilibrium is chosen the system outcome will satisfies the system specification.
Interesting is the case when not all equilibria satisfy the system objective. We propose nor-
mative mechanism design as a formal tool to investigate the effect of norms and sanctions to
influence the agents behavior. A normative mechanism M is essentially a set of norms and sanc-
tions. The violation of a norm can be sanctioned by modifying the structure of the CGS. If the
modification is successful and the resulting equilibria agree with the system outcome specified
by f , we say that M implements f wrt. the solution concept S. The sanctioning rules essentially
correspond to a relabelling of states, or a modification of the underlying transition structure as
action specifications are defined in terms of pre- and postconditions. For example, if an agent
has the goal of avoiding paying a fine, which can be specified by G¬fine, imposing a sanction
of paying a fine to some state will provide an incentive to the agent to avoid this very state in
which it would have to pay a fine. As a consequence, the behavior of the agent may change.
In addition to the formal modeling framework, we analyse decision problems related to the
question whether the system behavior can be modified in such a way that the system objective
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is satisfied. For our results we assume the concept of Nash equilibrium. In summary, the main
contributions are:
• We propose normative mechanism design to systematically study the effects of imposing
norms and sanctions on a MAS.
• We show that the verification problem, i.e. whether a specific set of norms does ensure a
desired system behavior, is coNP-complete.
• We show that the existence problem of an appropriate set of norms is ΣP3 -complete.
3.2 Monitoring Norm Violations in Multi-Agent Systems
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N., Dastani, M., and Knobbout, M. (2013a). Monitoring norm violations in
multi-agent systems. In Proc. of the 12th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS 2013), pages 491–498, Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA.
IFAAMAS, ACM Press
In the previous section we have proposed normative mechanism design as a means to con-
trol MASs. Sanctioning mechanisms were used to punish misbehaving agents in order to
change/influence their behavior. The issue of how to detect the violation of norms, however,
was not discussed. But of course, before sanctions can be imposed the violation of norms must
be detected. Detecting norm violations is difficult as monitoring mechanisms are often not per-
fect, due to cost or resource constraints, or due to technological limitations. In this paper, we
propose a formal, logic-based setting of norm monitoring and norm violation detection. We anal-
yse formal properties of monitors, in particular whether monitors are sufficient to detect all
violations with respect to a given norm or whether such a monitor can be obtained by combining
existing ones.
In the following we describe the basic model of the underlying normative framework. We
model it as a Kripke structure I; we abstract from the specific agents and consider only temporal
transitions. We use RI or just R to denote the set of runs/paths in the Kripke structure, i.e. R
is a set of infinite sequences of interconnected states. From an abstract point of view a norm is
simply a subset of runs N ⊆ R. It classifies runs into “good” and “bad” ones. A monitor observes
the behavior of the system. Ideally, if the current behavior is modeled by run r the monitor should
observe r. Often however, a monitor is not perfect and may not be able to perfectly identify the
current run. Therefore, we model a monitor as a function m : R → P(R). m(r) is the set of
runs, m considers possible if the true/current run is r. It can be the case that r ∈ m(r), but just
as well that r 6∈ m(r). In the latter case, the monitor does not consider the true run r possible.
We define several characteristics of monitors. Before we relate monitors and norms we describe
how to use LTL-formulae to define norms. For an LTL-formula χ, a χ-norm is defined as the set
Nχ = {r ∈ R | r |= χ}. That is, Nχ describes the normative behavior as the set of runs that
satisfy χ. Now, we can define what it means for a monitor to detect, or to not detect a violation
of a norm. For example, we say that monitor m returns on input run r
• χ-violation iff I,m(r) |= ¬χ; and
• χ-compliance iff I,m(r) |= χ
where for a set X ⊆ R of runs we define I, X |= ϕ iff I, r |=LTL ϕ for all r ∈ X. A χ-violation of
norm χ is detected wrt. run r, if on all behaviors that the monitor considers possible, ¬χ holds.
This does not mean that a real violation has occurred, a monitor can make mistakes in both
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ways: it can detect a violation when no violation occurred; and just as well may not detect a
violation in case an actual violation occurred. Next, it is outlined what it means for a monitor
to be sound, complete and sufficient: m is
• χ-sound in I iff for all r ∈ R it holds: I,m(r) |= ¬χ implies I, r |= ¬χ. In words, a monitor
is sound with respect to a norm χ when for every possible run of the system, it holds that
whenever a χ-violation is detected it is the case that the run was a χ-violation.
• χ-complete in I iff for all r ∈ R it holds: I, r |= ¬χ implies I,m(r) |= ¬χ. In words, a monitor
is complete with respect to a norm χ when for every possible run of the system, it holds that
whenever the run causes a χ-violation it is the case that a χ-violation is detected.
• χ-sufficient in I if m is χ-sound and χ-complete.
Ideally, we are interested in sufficient monitors as they detect all “relevant” norm violations and
only those. Up to this moment, the notion of monitor is rather abstract, for each norm there
exists a sufficient monitor. In the following the definition of monitor is made more concrete. We
use LTL-formulae to define monitors. For an LTL-formula ξ we define a ξ-monitor mξ by
mξ(r) := {r′ ∈ R | I, r |= ξ iff I, r′ |= ξ}.
Such a monitor defines an equivalence relation on the set of runs; the relation has at most
two equivalence classes. The notion of norm and monitor are specified using computational
methods. This makes it possible to devise decision procedures to determine whether a given
monitor is sufficient for a given norm. Therefore, we present characterization results. One of
the characterizations expresses that mξ is χ-sufficient in I if, and only if, I |= ¬χ or I |= χ
or I |= ¬ξ ↔ χ or I |= ξ ↔ χ. Thus, if χ is not a trivial formula, then χ must be equivalent
to ξ or ¬ξ. This result for “simple” LTL-monitors is only a corollary of a more sophisticated
characterization result for more expressive monitors.
By operator ⊕ two ore more LTL-monitors can be combined to a new monitor which is not
necessarily expressible by an LTL-monitor. The formal definition of ⊕ looks rather simple, for
two monitors m and m′, we define
m⊕m′ : R → P(R) with m⊕m′(r) := m(r) ∩m′(r).
In particular, m ⊕ m′ is no longer a binary classifier but can have more than two equivalence
classes. We also present a characterization theorem for combined LTL-monitors. There can be
several reasons to combine monitors from simpler ones. For example, the set of available monitors
is fixed, or only specific (simple) LTL-formulae can be used. Now, the characterization theorems
help to solve interesting decision problems about monitors. For example, we can pose the following
questions:
1. Does there exist an LTL-monitor mξ which is χ-sufficient over I?
2. Is a given monitor m (pure LTL-based or combined) χ-sufficient over I?
3. Is there a monitor in M , where M is a set of monitors, which is χ-sufficient over I?
4. Can we combine monitors m1, . . . ,mk ∈M in such a way that m1⊕ . . .⊕mk is χ-sufficient?
In the paper we show that all these problems are PSPACE-complete. In summary, the main
contributions of the paper are:
• We propose a formal framework for monitoring norm violations and a special class of monitors
based on LTL-formulae.
• We give characterization results for the existence of appropriate LTL-based monitors.
• We show that the problem whether a given LTL-based monitor is sufficient for detecting
norm violations is PSPACE-complete. An analogous questions wrt. to the combination of
LTL-monitors has the same complexity.
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3.3 Coalitional Responsibility in Strategic Settings
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. and Dastani, M. (2013). Coalitional responsibility in strategic settings.
In Leite, J. and Son, T. C., editors, 14th Int. Workshop on Computational Logic
in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XIV), LNCS, pages 172–189, Corunna, Spain.
Springer
In the two previous sections we have proposed formal approaches to analyze the effect of norms
to influence agents’ decision making in MASs, and to construct monitors for detecting norm
violations. The proposed monitors detect norm violations from a systemic perspective, not nec-
essarily, however, which agent was responsible for a norm violation. Monitors detect events and
not necessarily actions of agents. Also, in the case of simultaneous actions, all agents contributed
to an action which makes it difficult to ascribe responsibility to individuals or even groups of
agents. It is a non-trivial and highly relevant problem to determine which agent or group of
agents can be held responsible for a specific outcome. In this work, we propose a formal and
abstract notion of responsibility which is based on strategic power. It does not involve any moral
connotation per se. Furthermore, our analysis allows to assign degrees of responsibility to sub-
groups of agents in order to analyze which groups can be considered “more responsible than
others”. This is especially appealing in an organizational context.
In the following we briefly review the formal setting. First, we define a state of affairs as
a non-empty set of states. A coalition C is said to be responsible for a state of affairs if C is
the smallest coalition that can prevent the state of affairs. Prevention means that the coalition
C can guarantee that the system will not be in any of the states of the state of affairs. Using
ATL∗, this can be specified as 〈〈C〉〉X¬ϕ where ϕ describes the state of affairs. This is a rather
strong notion of responsibility as there may be several, incomparable coalitions that can prevent
a state of affairs, and thus, no smallest one. For this reason, the definition is relaxed. A weakly
responsible coalition for a state of affairs is a minimal coalition C that can prevent the state of
affairs. Now, there can be several weakly responsible coalitions. The underlying intuition is that
if the state of affairs has obtained, then none of the weakly responsible coalitions acted in a way
to prevent the state of affairs from obtaining. They are all somewhat responsible. To illustrate
this, we consider the CGS shown in Figure 3.2. We refer to player 1 as “Producer 1”, to 2 as
M q0 q1q2
Producer 1
Producer 2
Authority
failure
(prod,prod,nop)
(nop,nop,nop)
(prod,prod,oﬀ) (nop,prod,*)
(prod,nop,*)(nop,nop,*)
Fig. 3.2. The CGS M1 = ({1, 2, 3}, {q0, q1, q2}, {prod ,nop, off }, d, o) where d1(q0) = d2(q0) =
{prod , prod}, d3(q0) = {off , prod} and di(q) = {prod} for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and q ∈ {q1, q2}. The out-
come function o is shown in the figure, e.g. o(q0, (drive, drive, prod)) = q2. The star ? represents any
available action, i.e. ? ∈ {prod , off }.
“Producer 2”, and to 3 as “Authority”. Moreover, we assume that q0 is the initial state subject
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to which we evaluate the responsibility of coalitions. The story is as follows. Two electricity
producers inject energy into the power grid. The production of renewable energy often depends
on external circumstances, like wind strength and sun intensity. Very hot and windy days, e.g.,
can yield energy overproductions and even cause power failures. In our example we assume that
both power producers can decide to produce power (or not). Moreover, a regulation authority
can at all times force the producers to separate from the power grid. Let us assume that it is one
of these windy days. If both producers decide to produce energy this will cause a power failure,
if the regulation authority does not force the producers to stop their production. In this example
the weakly responsible coalitions for {q2} are exactly {1}, {2}, and {3}. However, no coalition is
responsible for {q2}. Again, it is important to note that this does not mean that no coalition is
responsible in the colloquial sense but simply that there are three (weakly) responsible coalitions.
The authority who has not separated the producers from the grid is as responsible for a power
failure (i.e. state {q2}) as the producers themselves.
Now, we are interested in the question whether some coalitions can be considered “more
responsible” than others. Therefore, we introduce the concept of crucial and necessary coalition.
Crucial coalitions are subcoalitions of a (weakly) responsible coalition which cannot be replaced
by other coalitions without the new coalition losing its characteristic of being (weakly) responsi-
ble. Necessary coalitions are defined similarly to crucial ones but the requirement of minimality
of the newly formed coalition, included in the notion of weak responsibility is removed. In the
example above, the only crucial coalition of any weakly responsible coalition is the empty set. For
example, Producer 1 in the weakly responsible coalition {1} can be replaced by Producer 2 yield-
ing the weakly responsible coalition {2}. Intuitively, this means that all members of a weakly
responsible coalition are “equally responsible” within this coalition. In the paper, we investi-
gate properties of these types of coalitions and in particular show that the maximally necessary
coalition is unique and corresponds to the intersection of all weakly responsible coalitions.
In addition to the conceptual modeling and the characterization results we discuss how re-
sponsibility can be refined if the actions of some players have been observed. Finally, we also
use a syntactic extension of Coalition Logic, essentially based on [A˚gotnes et al., 2008], to give
a purely logical characterization of our notion of responsibility. This shows that our notions of
responsibility are purely based on strategic ability. The logical characterization also provides, in
principle, an automatic way to reason about responsibility. In summary, the main contributions
are:
• We propose a strategic notion of group responsibility.
• We introduce a degree of responsibility among groups of agents.
• We give a logical characterization (essentially by using (Quantified) Coalition Logic [A˚gotnes
et al., 2008; Pauly, 2002]) of responsibility which allows to reason about these concepts.
Moreover, it shows that our notion of responsibility is purely strategic.

4Analysing Multi-Agent Decision Making
Game theory [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] is a mathematical tool to model and analyze strate-
gic interactions among rational players. A strategic game is a tuple G = (Agt, (Acti)i∈Agt,Out,
out,ut) composed of a set of agents Agt = {1, . . . , k}, a non-empty sets of actions1 Acti, one per
agent i ∈ Agt, a set of outcomes Out, a mapping out : Act→ Out from the set of action profiles
Act = Act1 × . . . × Actk to outcomes, and a vector of utility functions ut = (ut1, . . . , utk), one
utility function uti : Out → R per agent. The utility functions model agents’ preferences over
outcomes. For each agent i ∈ Agt, we also define a preference relation i over action profiles
α,α′ ∈ Act as follows: α i α′ iff uti(out(α)) ≥ uti(out(α′)). We use the following example,
taken from [Bulling, 2014b, Examples 1-3], to illustrate game theoretical reasoning:
Alice (A) has ordered a book and is waiting for delivery. Unfortunately, she does not
remember whether she declared her home or office address. She has to decide now
where to wait for the package: at home (action αh) or at the office (action αo). Un-
fortunately in addition to that, the address on the package is not well readable ex-
cept for Alice’s name. However, postman Bob (B), who has delivered Alice’s pack-
ages for many years, knows both addresses of Alice. There are four possible outcomes
of the interaction: Out = {HO,OO,OH,HH}. Outcome HO encodes that Alice is
at home (by Alice executing action αh) and the package was delivered to the office
(by Bob executing action αo); the other outcomes are interpreted analogously. Sup-
pose Bob does not care too much whether Alice gets her package or not; mostly,
he is interested to deliver the package as quickly as possible. As Alice’s home is on
Bob’s way he prefers to deliver the package there; if Alice would be there too, all
the better. Bob’s utility function is specified by: utB(HH) = 4, utB(OH) = 3 and
utB(OO) = utB(HO) = 0. The associated strategic game is given by ({A,B}, ({αo, αh},
{αo, αh}),Out, (utA, utB)) and shown in Figure 4.1(a). It is crucial to observe that Bob’s
decision influences Alice’s. The action profile (αh, αh) yielding outcome HH is the unique
stable solution: for all other action profiles one of the players would be better off to change
her/his action. Suppose now, Bob still prefers to go to Alice’s home but, as he is a nice
guy, primarily prefers that Alice will receive her package: utB(HH) = 4, utB(OO) = 3,
utB(OH) = 2, utB(HO) = 1. This new setting is depicted in Figure 4.1(b). Where should
Alice and Bob go now? When analyzing the game it is important that Alice and Bob
cannot communicate with each other nor make binding agreements. The modified game
has two stable action profiles: (αo, αo) and (αh, αh) with the associated outcomes OO
1 In this context, actions are also called strategies.
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A\B αo αh
αo
αh
(4, 0)
(1, 0)
(2, 3)
(3, 4)
A\B αo αh
αo
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(4, 3)
(1, 1)
(2, 2)
(3, 4)
Fig. 4.1. Package deliver example. On the left (a) with selfish Bob and right (b) with cooperative Bob.
and HH, respectively. From none of these action profiles a player can unilaterally deviate
from his/her action to obtain a better utility. How to coordinate to reach one of these
outcome is another problem.
The action profiles yielding the stable outcomes OO and HH in the example are called Nash
equilibria. In general, an action profile α ∈ Act is a Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1950] if no agent
can unilaterally deviate to improve its outcome. Formally, α ∈ Act is a Nash equilibrium if,
and only if, for all agents i ∈ Agt and all actions α′i ∈ Acti of player i it is the case that
α i (α1, . . . , αi−1, α′i, αi+1, . . . , αk).
Game theory has its origins in economics. It is suitable to analyse the decision making of
economically or politically driven stakeholders. In multi-agent systems game theory has become
a popular tool to investigate the behavior of rational agents or system components. Game theory
can also be applied to our smart grid example. The stakeholders (customers, power producers,
regulation authorities, etc.) can be modeled as rational players all with their own interests and
capabilities. To analyze strategic interactions and decision making in MASs we also use the rather
abstract model of Boolean games. A Boolean game [Harrenstein et al., 2001; Bonzon et al., 2006;
Dunne et al., 2008] is a computational, compact model of interactions in MASs. Agents control
propositional variables; actions correspond to setting a variable true or false, respectively. The
control of a variable is exclusive. Most importantly, Boolean games include qualitative objectives
in form of propositional logic formulae. The truth of formulae usually depends on the actions of
multiple agents. This requires strategic reasoning and acting. Suppose, for example, that player 1
has the objective (p∧ q)∨ (r∧s) where only p and r are controlled by 1. The variable q and s are
controlled by agent 2 and 3, respectively. Then, agent 1 relies on 2 or 3 to satisfy its objective. So,
it is a strategic decision whether 1 should set p or r true. In addition to the qualitative objective,
the setting of truth values does not come for free and incurs some cost. Thus, as a secondary
objective agents want to minimize costs. Boolean games allow to model many interesting aspects
of strategic interactions in MASs. In this thesis we use Boolean games to model secrecy aspect
in multi-agent decision making, and to analyze stability in socio-technical systems.
In Section 4.2, we give an overview of multi-agent decision making. Then, in Section 4.2 we
use game theoretical concepts to analyze and to compute network topologies in mobile-ad hoc
networks, and investigate properties related to optimality and stability.
In Section 4.3 we use Boolean games to analyze agents’ decision making in case they have
goals that they want to keep secret. That is, an agent tries to achieve its goal without letting
others know what the goal is until it has actually been achieved. We model this by assuming
that agents take their decisions sequentially. Hence, actions have to be selected in a clever way
in order not to reveal the objectives.
Finally, in Section 4.4 we use Boolean games to analyze stable behaviors in socio-technical sys-
tems [Trist, 1981], which are systems combining a technical part (e.g. the physical infrastructure
of a company) with a social one.
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4.1 A Survey of Multi-Agent Decision Making
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. (2014b). A Survey of Multi-Agent Decision Making. KI, 28(3):147–158
In this article we give an overview of multi-agent decision making (MADM). Figure 4.2 illustrates
the various aspects of MADM. We discuss classical decision making considering qualitative and
From Individual to Multi-Agent Decision Making: An Overview
multi-agent  decision making models interaction models, 
Boolean games, 
concurrent games 
structures
stochastic games (SG), POSG
strategic games, Bayesian games,…
objectives quantitative (utility maximization) 
+ stability (solution concept)
qualitative (e.g. reachability/temporal property), 
also quantitative  + stability (solution concept)
analysis, prediction, and reasoning
game theory
(qualitative and quantitative)
bounded 
rationality
BDI, MAOP, 
opponent model, 
multi-agent logics
reaching agreements interactively
auctions, argumentation, bargaining, commitments, communication, 
interaction protocols, negotiation, social choice, voting
planning, coordination and control
decision delegation, norms, mechanism design, organizations and 
institutions, communication, commitments, planning, learning, simulation
further aspects
trust, emotions, responsibility, communication, social aspects, knowledge 
analysis and prediction
qualitative 
decision theory
(likelihood and 
preference orderings)
quantitative 
decision theory
(probability and 
utility theory)
planning and problem solving
planning and 
learning
distributed problem 
solving
interdisciplinary 
theories, tools and 
techniques 
(e.g. (D)AI, philosophy, 
control theory)
(complex) decision making models
decentralized 
(PO)MDP
cooperative
multi-agent 
(PO)MDP
Markov decision 
process (MDP),
POMDP
objectives
quantitative (utility maximization) 
individual collective multi-agent (fluent passage)
BDI, 
MAOP
individual collective multi-agent (fluent passage)
used
used
used
Fig. 4.2. Overview of aspects relevant to MADM. The passage from individual (left) to multi-agent
(right) is partly fluent.
quantitative approaches. In classical quantitative decision theory the worth of an outcome is
measured by a utility function ut : Out→ R. An agent tries to maximize its expected utility. The
quantitative approach is appealing if the complete model is given but has limitations in case of
dynamic or unforeseen situations. The same holds if there is no easy way to assign utility values
to outcomes. Qualitative decision theory replaces utility values with qualitative descriptions, e.g.
by using relations or logic-based approaches. Then, we turn to game theory, the mathematical
framework for analyzing MADM. A key characteristic of MADM is the self-interest of agents,
and that their decisions affect the decisions of others and vice versa. That is, when computing
the best action, agents have to take into consideration the behavior of other agents. This has
been illustrated in the example given at the beginning of this section. In the survey article,
we also discuss how decisions can be influenced and controlled using mechanism design. We
also touch upon human decision making, the decision making of bounded rational agents, as
well as on multi-agent programming and multi-agent logics. Then, we turn to the interactive
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process of MADM in more detail. In this part we especially give an overview on negotiation and
argumentation techniques. We also consider norms and organizations as means to control the
decision making process in MASs.
4.2 A Game-Theoretic Approach to Stability in Mobile Ad-Hoc
Networks
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. and Popovici, M. (2014). A game-theoretic approach to compute stable
topologies in mobile ad-hoc networks. Journal of Logic and Computation, 25(3):639–
667
In this work we propose a formal modeling for analyzing and computing stable network topologies
for inter-connecting users in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). MANETs are networks in
which mobile users can communicate in an ad-hoc way without relying on a fixed infrastructure.
Examples of such networks include delay-tolerant networks [Fall, 2003], sensor networks and
opportunistic networks [Pelusi et al., 2006; Lilien et al., 2007]. MANETs offer great possibilities
for today’s demands, e.g. networks are created when they are needed; they can be used for many
application domains; and they are easy to set-up among smart devices. But this flexibility also
has a price when it comes to security as well as privacy issues [Djenouri et al., 2005; Hu and
Perrig, 2004], and the quality of service and reliability of the network [Royer and Toh, 1999]. In
particular in a social context, it is important to incentivize users to offer services and not just to
use them. Classical examples are file sharing platforms. The aim of this paper is to analyze and to
compute network topologies which are accepted by users, that is, which offer a “fair” solution. We
take into consideration aspects related to fairness and stability and make use of game theoretical
techniques. We also take into account user constraints about the network topology, e.g. users can
specify routing constraints. A schematic view of the framework is shown in Figure 4.3.
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E.g. Nash, strong Nash, core, etc. 
 
 
Application for generating 
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Users 
 
 
 
 
Defines the protocol which 
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Generates 
3. Management of payments and 
channels 
4. Use the topology 
2. Inform about goals & 
constraints 
1. Agree with the property 
(necessary for using the 
application) 
Fig. 4.3. The basic idea of the complete framework [Bulling and Popovici, 2014].
The basic model is called network frame F = (Users, N, throughput, trans cost, Π, I) consisting
of a set of users Users, a neighborhood function N : Users → 2Users with i 6∈ N(i), a throughput
function throughput : LinksF → N, a transmission cost function trans cost : LinksF → R+ where
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LinksF = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ Users, j ∈ N(i)} is the set of all potential communication links in F , a
set of propositional symbols Π that represent different user properties, and a valuation function
I : Users → 2Π assigning a set of propositions to each user. An example of a network frame is
given by F1 shown in the leftmost subfigure of Figure 4.4, where Users = {1, 2, 3, 4}, N(1) = {2},
N(2) = {3, 4}, N(3) = N(4) = ∅, Π = {p, q, r}, I(1) = ∅, I(2) = {q}, I(3) = {p, r} and
I(4) = {p}. The transmission costs and throughput are defined as follows: trans cost((1, 2)) = 1,
trans cost((2, 4)) = 0.5, trans cost((2, 3)) = 2, and throughput(l) = |Users| for all l ∈ LinksF1 .
In F1 (shown in Figure 4.4) the labelled dashed arrows describe the potential communication
links; the numbers represent the transmission costs of each of the respective communication
links. The transmission cost function encodes how costly it is to establish (and use) a potential
communication link between two players. The throughput function defines how much data can
be sent via a link. Here, we assume that the throughput defines the number of players that can
use a link. If a link is used for more than one player, costs are shared equally.
1 2
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Fig. 4.4. A NF F1 (left) and two F1-topologies T1 (middle) and T2 (right).
A network frame models only the possible communication links. A network topology over a
network frame is a specific instantiation of the communication links. Two examples of topologies
over F1 are T1 and T2 shown in the same figure. In T1 user 1 uses the channel from node 1 to 2,
and both users share the channel from 2 to 3. Sharing a channel also means to share the incurred
costs. Additionally, network frames are extended with user constraints/goals. Each player can
specify a preference over network topologies, e.g. network A should be accessible via at most two
hops or Internet should be accessible via a path that doesn’t pass through player i, etc. Hence,
the choice of a specific network topology depends on the cost of the topology and whether the
constraints/goals are satisfied. In the example above, suppose player 1’s goal is to reach a state
in which p holds. Then, both topologies T1 and T2 satisfy this goal. In T1 the player uses the link
(1, 2) and (2, 3), the latter jointly with player 2. In T2 it uses (1, 2) and (2, 4). Analogously, for
player 2. The topology T2 incurs costs of 1.5 for player 1 where T2 incurs costs of 2 = 1 + 22 . The
latter denotes the costs of the channel from 2 to 3 for each player; the costs of 2 are shared among
both players. Player 1 prefers topology T2. On the other hand, player 2 favors T1 in case its goal
was to visit a state in which r holds. In that topology the player has to pay 1 in comparison to
costs of 2 in T2. Also, T1 is globally optimal, the sum of the costs of all players is minimal. In
this specific example, it can be argued that T1 is a stable topology. Player 1 prefers T2 but it
cannot force player 2 to establish the link (2, 4)—each user decides which outgoing transition to
establish, i.e. which messages to forward for which other users. Not using the link (2, 3), on the
other hand, is also not an option for player 1 as its goals would not be satisfied.
In general, however, there may not be stable topologies. Also, stability depends on the very
concept of stability used. The above reasoning corresponds to stability using the concept of Nash
equilibrium. The next natural step is to consider the deviation of subgroups, the strong Nash
equilibrium concept. Thus, the computation of “good” topologies should take into consideration
aspects of (global) optimality, fairness, and stability. We investigate those aspects via a game
theoretical modeling—non-cooperative as well as cooperative. We compute topologies based on
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Nash as well as strong Nash equilibrium, and two variants of the core solution concept. The
resulting topologies are compared to each other and are evaluated with respect to optimality,
fairness, and stability. We show that the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are different
regarding the properties they induce and also from a conceptual point of view. Further, it is
shown that non of the proposed solutions is completely satisfactory for stability and optimality,
but that some—the cooperative ones, as we argue—solutions come quite close. In our opinion the
specific choice of a solution concept depends on the considered scenario; in particular, whether
the setting contains more cooperative or non-cooperative elements. We believe that it often makes
sense to assume that players behave more cooperatively in the context of social applications.
In addition to the conceptual modeling and investigation of properties of the solution concepts,
we also propose a computational setting based on the computation tree logic CTL [Clarke and
Emerson, 1981]. The logic is used to specify the constraints/goals of a player about the topology.
We analyze the complexity of decision problems and of the synthesis problem to actually compute
topologies according to some solution concept. The main contributions of this work are:
• We propose a formal modeling to analyze network topologies in MANETs.
• We use game theoretical solution concepts to analyze aspects related to fairness, optimality
and stability.
• We allow users to specify constraints, by means of CTL.
• We investigate computational complexity issues with respect to computing network topolo-
gies.
4.3 Reaching Your Goals Without Spilling The Beans: Boolean
Secrecy Games
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N., Ghosh, S., and Verbrugge, R. (2013b). Reaching your goals without spilling
the beans: Boolean secrecy games. In PRIMA 2013: Principles and Practice of Multi-
Agent Systems - 16th International Conference, Dunedin, New Zealand, December
1-6, 2013. Proceedings, volume 8291 of LNCS, pages 37–53, Dunedin, New Zealand.
Springer
Boolean games can be seen as strategic games extended with qualitative objectives in a compu-
tationally grounded setting. In these games, as in strategic games, agents act simultaneously and
the agents’ objectives are known to all other agents. In this work we assume that agents want to
keep their objectives secret. More precisely, they want to keep the objectives secret until they will
be achieved. We model this by assuming that agents act sequentially and observably to others.
As a consequence, in order to keep an objective secret it is not enough to have a strategy to
satisfy it, but at the same time to act in such a way that the other agents are uncertain about the
agent’s true objective. For example, suppose a company A would like to absorb a stock company
B. It can be of strategic importance that the involved stock market players are not aware of A’s
plan to buy sufficiently many stocks until A actually holds the majority of the stocks of B. This
complicates the strategic reasoning process.
Our formal model uses the basic ingredients of Boolean games [Harrenstein et al., 2001; Bon-
zon et al., 2006], as discussed before. In particular, agents’ objectives are given by propositional
formulae and actions correspond to assigning truth values to propositional variables. We define
a Boolean secrecy frame
F = (Players,Π, (Pi)i∈Players, Γ, (Γi)i∈Players, (ci)i∈Players, (Ci)i∈Players),
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where Players and Π are non-empty sets of players and propositions, respectively; function
ci : Σi → R+ represents the costs associated with the moves Σi (i.e. essentially two actions for
each propositions controlled by player i: one to set it true and and another one to set it false) of
player i; Ci ∈ R+ is the cost limit for player i; Γ ⊆ L is the set of possible goals for the players,
which is commonly known to all players; and Γi ⊆ Γ is the set of secret goals of player i, not
visible to the other players.
In addition to standard Boolean games, players not only want one of their goals to become
true, but to make a goal true without spilling the beans, meaning without others knowing about
their goals until one goal has actually become true. Therefore, our model may be seen as a turn-
based variant of Boolean games with additional assumptions. At each step one of the players
decides about the truth of one of its variables. This action, however, may reveal information
about the agents secret goals. In order to preserve secrecy of a player i, we require that at each
step there is a non-goal formula ϕ′ that could, however, be a potential goal of i from the other
players’ perspectives. Among other things, we require that ϕ′ can be guaranteed by i at some
possible (future) play. This already suggests that the order in which players move can affect who
wins the game. Thus, a Boolean secrecy game is based on a Boolean secrecy frame together with
a turn function defining which player is about to move next. Given such a Boolean secrecy game
we are interested in the question whether there is a player which has a goal achieving strategy
which incurs costs lower or equal to the players cost constraint. The notion of goal-achieving is
rather sophisticated.
The conceptual modeling is the main contribution of the paper. We show that Boolean secrecy
games are not determined, meaning there is not necessarily a winning player, and that the order
in which players put forward their actions affects the outcome of the game. We also consider
decision problems related to the question whether there is a winning player, and give computa-
tional complexity results. We show that this is a difficult problem: we prove ΣP2 -hardness and
membership in ΣP4 for the most general problem. In summary, the main contributions are:
• We propose the framework of Boolean secrecy games.
• We analyze the complexity of determining whether there is a winning player. For a limited
case we show that the problem is in P if the game is given in explicit from. For the general
case in which the order of interaction is known, we show that it is in ∆P2 and coNP-hard.
Finally, we show that in the most general case, in which the order of interaction is unknown,
the problem is in ΣP4 and Σ
P
2 -hard.
4.4 A Boolean Game Based Modelling of Socio-Technical Systems
This section summarizes:
Bulling, N. (2014a). A Boolean game based modelling of socio-technical systems. In
Mueller, J. P., Weyrich, M., and Bazzan, A. L. C., editors, MATES 2014: Multiagent
System Technologies XII, LNAI, pages 7–25. Springer
Social-technical systems (STSs) are complex systems in which social as well as technological
aspects play a decisive role for their functioning. Social aspects are often related to people
and their behavior, or societal constraints. The technical system captures the technology and
processes not related to “societal issues”. Socio-technical theory is concerned with the joint
optimization of both parts, that is, with the design of “good” systems comprising technological
as well as social aspects. The connection of STSs with MASs is evident: both approaches contain
self-interested actors, humans or intelligent agents, which need to cooperate with others in order
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to bring about their tasks and the objective of the system. In this work we use techniques from
MASs to model and to analyze STSs, and in particular, to investigate aspects related to system
stability. We propose a formal model for the technical and social (sub)system of a STS. We model
the social system by constrained Boolean games, a slight extension of Boolean games.
Formally, a constrained Boolean game is given by
G = (Users, Π, c, (γi)i∈Users, (Πi)i∈Users, ϕ)
where G′ = (Users, Π, c, (γi)i∈Users), (Πi)i∈Users) is a Boolean game and ϕ ∈ PL(Π) is a proposi-
tional formula serving as (global) constraint on the agents’ behavior. An assignment ξ is said to
be ϕ-consistent iff ϕ follows from the assignment ξ, in the propositional sense. A global constraint
can impose restrictions on the truth values of variables of the players and of the environment.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in constrained Boolean games where ϕ is built over en-
vironmental variables only; that is, over variables controlled by no player. Such a constraint can
be interpreted as information given to the players about the truth values of the environmental
variables. We call these game Boolean games with information. They are similar to the variant
of Boolean games considered in [Grant et al., 2014] where each player has a belief about the en-
vironmental variables. We define the Nash equilibrium solution concept for constrained Boolean
games.
One of the key contributions of the paper is the use of Boolean games with information to
model the distributed social subsystems of a socio-technical system. A socio-technical system
consists of a technical system T and a social system S. The technical system is defined over a set
of available objects or artefacts (e.g. offices), modeled by propositional variables, and a technical
constraint T which models the size and structure of a socio-technical system. For example, T
can encode the number of rooms in a building and their capacity. A social system is a tuple
S = (Agt, pow, (S1, δ1, δI1), . . . , (Ss, δs, δIs ), ι) where Agt is a set of agents, pow specifies the power
of agents or more precisely the power they are allowed to exercise in the social system (i.e. which
variables they are allowed to control), and each Si is a set of agents modeling an organization
unit. Each organization unit has a private goal δi in form of a propositional formula. As this
goal is not known to members outside the organization unit, each organization unit also publicly
and truthfully announces parts of its private objective—the public organization objective δIi . The
public objective is used to coordinate the behaviors between the distributed organization units
to achieve a desirable system behavior. Finally, ι is an incentive scheme which can be installed
by the owner of the STS to influence the behavior of agents in the social system. Incentives could
for instance model bonuses, extra vacation days, or other benefits. Analogously, it would also be
possible to consider taxation schemes instead, modeling taxes, fines, etc.
The emerging system behavior is defined as a combination of the behaviors in each organiza-
tion unit, which in turn corresponds to stable behaviors of the Boolean games with information,
induced by each organization unit in a social system. Confidentiality constraints and system
specifications are introduced to describe desirable properties of the behaviors of socio-technical
systems. A natural question is whether the agents’ behavior can be influenced in such a way that
a given confidentiality constraint and system specification are met. The modeling as Boolean
game (with information) has the advantage that we can use techniques known from the Boolean
games literature. In particular, we analyze how incentive engineering [Wooldridge et al., 2013]
can be used to influence the behavior in a social system to obtain a desirable system behavior.
In the paper we give first logic-based characterization results, using techniques from [Wooldridge
et al., 2013], which allow to answer such questions by a reduction to the satisfiability problem of
quantified Boolean formulae. The main contributions of the paper are:
• A formal model of STSs.
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• An approach combing the area of STSs with foundation of MASs (Boolean games).
• A proposal on how to “distribute” Boolean games in order to model social subsystems of a
STS and to achieve stability.
• Logic-based characterization results for the existence of incentive schemes to stabilize STSs.

5Conclusions
Multi-agent systems (MASs) are distributed (computer) systems composed of autonomously
(inter-)acting system components referred to as agents. MASs offer a flexible framework to model
and analyse many real world settings in which cooperation, self-interest, and autonomy are
crucial elements. A key challenge in such settings is the control and coordination of behavior.
However, due to the agents’ autonomy behavior can often not be controlled, but at best be
influenced in some way or another. For example, agents can be given incentives in order to affect
their decision-making in such a way that the emergent behavior of all actors is desirable from
the system’s perspective. Such an approach can be successful if the incentives are sufficient to
align the agents’ behavior, primarily driven by their individual preferences, with the system’s
objectives. The properties of self-interest and autonomy make it challenging to find appropriate
control mechanisms. Existing coordination and control approaches from the distributed system
literature are often not applicable due to the lack of direct control on the system components
of MASs. New methods and tools are needed. In this thesis formal foundations related to the
subjects of decision making, coordination and control in MASs were proposed and investigated.
In particular, the work in the thesis contributed to the following aspects: (i) logics for modelling
and reasoning about the decision making of agents; (ii) influencing, controlling and coordinating
decisions; and (iii) analyzing and predicting decisions.
In (i) we investigated (extensions of) temporal and strategic logics which capture specific capa-
bilities of agents that influence their decision making. We gave an overview of models of strategic
reasoning [Bulling et al., 2015] and analyzed how memory and information affect capabilities of
agents in game-like settings [Bulling and Jamroga, 2014]. Limitations of existing memory-based
semantics for the strategic logic ATL∗ [Alur et al., 2002] were pointed out and a new “no for-
getting semantics” for agents with truly perfect recall was presented [Bulling et al., 2014]. We
also argued for the need of quantitative aspects in strategic logics and proposed Quantitative
ATL∗ [Bulling and Goranko, 2013], an extension of ATL∗ combining qualitative and quantitative
reasoning. Then, in [Bulling and Jamroga, 2011], we took on a more computational point of view
and proposed an epistemic extension of Alur et al. [2002]’s alternating µ-calculus that offers a
new type of strategic ability as well as a promising computational complexity result regarding
the model checking of epistemic strategic logics. In the last part of Section 2, we analyzed logic-
based settings of fragments of BDI-based temporal logics with respect to their computational
complexity [Bulling and Hindriks, 2011]. The logics discussed in this work allow to reason about
agents’ abilities. In particular, they can be used for specifications which can then serve as a basis
for formal system verification.
42 5 Conclusions
If it appears (e.g. by using model checking) that agents are capable of producing undesirable
system executions, the designer of the system can impose mechanisms to influence the agents’
decision making in order to avoid such executions. This was the subject of part (ii) of the
thesis. We merged mechanism design with normative systems [Bulling and Dastani, 2011] and
analyzed whether the system designer can create a set of norms which is sufficient to influence
the agents behavior in a way desirable for the system. We argued that this is just one piece of
the whole process. Norm violations have to be detected and managed. Therefore, we investigated
monitors to detect specific (undesirable) behaviors [Bulling et al., 2013a] and also how to ascribe
responsibility to (groups of) agents [Bulling and Dastani, 2013].
In the last part of the thesis, we were concerned with analyzing the decision making process of
agents under aspects of stability, privacy, and secrecy. First, we gave an overview on multi-agent
decision making [Bulling, 2014b]. Then, we proposed a framework that uses game-theoretical
solution concepts as protocols to analyze and to compute “fair” network topologies in mobile ad
hoc networks [Bulling and Popovici, 2014]. We also modeled and investigated how secrecy/privacy
issues affect decision making, using the Boolean game model [Bulling et al., 2013b]. Finally,
in [Bulling, 2014a] we showed how Boolean games can be used as an abstract approach to model
stability in socio-technical systems, taking into consideration confidentiality aspects.
Such formal approaches and tools to analyse and control autonomous systems are crucial for
the development of reliable systems and will become even more crucial in the near future. Already
today, existing technology is advanced and allows ubiquitous computing, for example, social
applications are ever increasing and the activities in the daily life become strongly connected
as in smart grids and smart homes. MASs provide a suitable abstraction of many types of such
complex systems. The formal methods investigated in this thesis can help to design and analyze
these systems; for example, logics and model checking for system verification, norms to coordinate
and control the behavior of users, and game theory to predict and better understand the complex
and emerging system interactions. The work of this thesis contributes to the formal foundations
of MASs. For future work it is interesting to apply the theories to tackle real world problems. This
requires methods with good computational properties and empirical studies, e.g. by simulations.
This also connects to another important aspect often neglected in a game theoretic setting:
human behavior. There is an ever-increasing interplay between intelligent systems and humans
and this must also be reflected in the formal tools used to analyse and develop these systems. In
this context, simulation can also be used to provide a model of human behavior, and on a more
foundational side it seems appealing to combine theories on bounded rationality and evolutionary
game theory with existing formal methods to obtain suitable prediction methods. The area of
interaction and decision making in complex, autonomous systems remains an interesting one and
offers many future challenges.
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